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I. PARTIES BELOW 
Plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen (or "Dr. Chen"), individually and as the natural guardian of her 
three minor children Chi Wei Zhang, E. Lei Zhang and E. E. Zhang (the "Zhang Children"), 
sued Jau-Hwa Stewart (or "Ms. Stewart") and E. Excel International, Inc. ("Excel USA" or 
"E. Excel") in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Case No. 010400098. 
Third-Party Plaintiff Excel USA sued Third-Party Defendants Taig Stewart, Hwan 
Lan Chen (or "Madam Chen"), Beverly Warner (or "Ms. Warner"), Angela Barclay (or "Ms. 
Barclay"), Dale Stewart, Sam Tzu (or "Mr. Tzu"), Richard Hu (or "Mr. Hu"), Apogee, Inc. 
(or "Apogee"), Apogee Essence International Philippines, Inc., Excellent Essentials 
International Corp., USA Apogee, Ltd., Shannon River, Inc. (or "Shannon River"), Shannon 
Heaton, Sheue Wen Smith (or "Ms. Smith"), Bryan Hymas (or "Mr. Hymas"), Paul Cooper, 
Byron Murray (or "Dr. Murray") and Kim O'Neill (or "Dr. O'Neill) in Case No. 01400098. 
Ms. Stewart and Excel USA sued Dr. Chen, her husband, Rui-Kang Zhang ("Mr. 
Zhang"), E. Excel Limited ("Excel Ltd."), E. Excel International (Taiwan) Inc. ("Excel 
Taiwan"), Huan-Hsin Le (or "Mr. Le"), Extra Excel (Malaysia) SDM BHD ("Excel 
Malaysia") and Hendrik Tjandra (or "Mr. Tjandra") in the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
Case No. 01400201. Case No. 01400201 was consolidated with Case No. 01400098 on 
February 21, 2002. 
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IV. JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
V. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. In connection with the admission of a recording of a telephone conversation 
(the "Conversation" or "Exhibit 104M): 
1. Did Ms. Stewart fail to overcome the presumption of admissibility of 
relevant evidence because she did not establish that Exhibit 104 was created or used in 
violation of state or federal law? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's factual determinations are reviewed 
under a "clearly erroneous" standard. See State v. Pena, 896 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). 
2. Was Exhibit 104 properly admitted as impeachment evidence against 
Mr. Hu? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Admissibility determinations are reviewed for abuse of 
discretion and will not be reversed unless the trial court so abused its discretion that there is 
a likelihood that injustice resulted. State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, f 12, 63 P.3d at 72, 75; 
State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219, f^ 11, 51 P.3d 55. Legal conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness, State v. Quinonez-Gaiton, 2000 UT App 273, ^ 9, 54 P.3d 139, 142, but the 
Court will "presume the discretion of the trial court was properly exercised unless the record 
clearly shows to the contrary." State v. Widdison, 2000 UT App 185, \ 45,4 P.3d 100, 111. 
3. Did Ms. Stewart waive objection to use of Exhibit 104 as evidence of 
her obstruction of justice? 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness and 
factual findings for clear error. Nunley v. Westates Casing Services, Inc., 989 P.2d 1079 
(Utah 2000); Angelos v. Russell, 671 P.2d 774 (Utah 1983) (trial court's findings given 
"considerable deference"); Pledger v. Gillespie, 982 P.2d 572 (Utah 1999). 
4. Was it proper for the trial court to consider Exhibit 104 as evidence of 
Ms. Stewart's contempt? 
a. Is Ms. Stewart precluded from raising for the first time on appeal 
the claim that the court improperly considered Exhibit 104 as evidence of her contempt?1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Appellate courts will not consider an issue raised for the 
first time on appeal absent plain error. See OnglnVl (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 
P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993); State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 333 (Utah 1993). 
b. Is Ms. Stewart barred from objecting to use of Exhibit 104 since 
she introduced her own translation and admitted she had tried to mislead the Utah court? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW: See Standard of Review, Issue A(2). 
B. Did the court properly strike Ms. Stewart's pleadings? 
1. Did Ms. Stewart fail to preserve the issue of the court's authority? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: See Standard of Review, Issue A(4)(a). 
2. Did the trial court have the authority to strike Ms. Stewart's pleadings? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The decision is reviewed for correctness, allowing the 
lMs. Stewart does not identify in her Statement of Issues where she preserved the 
issue that she argues at pages 47-48 of her Brief-that the court impermissibly considered 
evidence admitted to impeach Mr. Hu as substantive evidence of her contempt. She made 
no such objection and did not preserve the issue. She even submitted her own translation. 
2 
trial court some discretion in the application of the law to given facts. See State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994); Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1995). 
3. Did the trial court properly strike Ms. Stewart's pleadings? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Exercise of the contempt power is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and in the absence of capricious and arbitrary conduct, the 
reviewing court will not disagree. Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, ^[ 39-41. 
4. Did Ms. Stewart fail to marshal the evidence to support her claim that 
the trial court abused its discretion in striking her pleadings? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The factual findings will not be disturbed unless they are 
against the clear weight of the evidence. Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, ^ j 15, 979 P.2d 338. 
Where a trial court's rulings on fact-dependent issues are challenged, this Court grants the 
court broader than normal deference. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-38 (Utah 1994). 
Where appellant fails to marshal, the Court assumes all findings are adequately supported by 
the evidence. Utah Medical Products, Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 233 (Utah 1998). 
C. Were Ms. Stewart's due process rights violated? 
1. Did Ms. Stewart fail to preserve the issue of her right to a jury? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: See Standard of Review, Issues A(3) and A(4)(a). 
2. Did Ms. Stewart fail to preserve the issue of the scope of the evidence 
considered by the trial court? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: See Standard for Review, Issue A(4)(a). 
3. Were Ms. Stewart's due process rights impaired by Mr. Holman's 
3 
involvement? 
a. Are Ms. Stewart's arguments concerning the Special Master 
misdirected and inappropriate in this appeal? See November 2002 Order (Addendum D). 
b. Did Ms. Stewart fail to preserve this issue below? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: See Standard of Review, Issue A(4)(a). 
c. Are the Contempt Orders supported by competent evidence in 
the record independent of Mr. Holman's involvement? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The determination is reviewed for correctness, except 
for the necessary subsidiary factual determinations which are reviewed under a clearly 
erroneous standard. See State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, H 22, 48 P.3d 958, 962; State v. 
Parra, 972 P.2d 924, 926-27 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); see Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234; 1244 
(Utah 1998). 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 10, 2001, Dr. Chen obtained a Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO"). 
Addendum A. The TRO was extended on January 24, 2001. R. 14222:171. The First 
Preliminary Injunction Hearing began January 19, 2001, and concluded with the entry of a 
stipulated order on February 21, 2001 "Interim Order." Addendum B. In the summer of 
2001, Dr. Chen filed two contempt motions against Ms. Stewart ("Contempt Motion(s)"). 
The first dealt with violations of the TRO and of the Interim Order, and the second dealt with 
obstruction of justice. R. 2074; R. 14305-07. Hearings on the Contempt Motions began 
October 25, 2001, R. 14244, and concluded June 26, 2002 ("OSC Hearings"). R. 14276. 
4 
On August 20,2002, the trial court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
on the Contempt Motions ("Contempt Orders" or "Contempt Findings"). R. 14317. The 
trial court found Ms. Stewart in contempt for violating the TRO and the Interim Order, and 
also in contempt for obstructing justice, R. 14317: 119-26, and struck Ms. Stewart's 
pleadings. R. 14317: 126. Ms. Stewart filed a Notice of Appeal on September 19,2002. R. 
8777. Dr. Chen filed a Motion to Dismiss the appeal. Addendum C. This Court found the 
Contempt Orders included elements of criminal contempt and would be treated as final. 
Addendum D. 
VII. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OF CONTROL OF EXCEL USA, 
Dr. Chen and Ms. Stewart are sisters. Dr. Chen is the youngest of five children born 
to Yung-Yeuan Chen (deceased) and Madam Chen. R. 14293: 170. She is married to Mr. 
Zhang. Id. at 172. They are the parents of the Zhang Children. Id. at 169. 
Dr. Chen obtained a Ph.D in microbiology with an emphasis in immunology from 
Brigham Young University at the age of 26. Id. at 170. She utilized her education to 
develop products to enhance health through "nutritional immunology." Id. at 171-2. Excel 
USA filed its Articles of Incorporation on July 20, 1987. R. 14338: Ex. 18. Dr. Chen was 
its only shareholder from incorporation until the end of 1995. R. 14338: Exs. 19, 20. 
Dr. Chen served as its president and chairperson of its board of directors from the time 
of Excel USA's incorporation. R. 14230:83. In the early 1990s, Dr. Chen's sister, Ms. 
Stewart, became the vice-president of Excel USA and Excel USA's third director, and Dr. 
5 
Chen's parents left the Board. R. 14293: 30, 63; R. 14245: 5-6. 
Excel USA's business of manufacturing and selling health products grew from 
approximately 20 product lines to well over 100 product lines. R. 14293: 184. Excel USA 
marketed its products to distributors exclusively through Territorial Owners in places such 
as Taiwan, The Phillippines, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore. Id. at 174, 184-85.2 
At the time of Ms. Stewart's "coup," Excel USA had exclusive contracts with certain 
Territorial Owners. R. 14226: 32-34, 36-37, 99-101, 105, 109; R. 14293: 158-59, 175-78; 
R. 14339: Exs. 38,39;R. 14222:13-18,108-110,147,152; R. 14293: 158-59; R. 14230: 56-
59; R. 14338: Ex. 1. Ms. Stewart knew this. R. 14293: 158-59,180.3 With Dr. Chen's time 
principally devoted to marketing Excel USA's products and developing Excel USA's 
distributorship capabilities, Ms. Stewart's duties involved handling the day-to-day 
administrative operations of Excel USA. R. 14223: 70; R. 14228: 66; R. 14255: 10-12, 14. 
2Dr. Chen was Excel USA's spokesperson and symbolic representative for its 
products. Photographs and articles featuring her as founder and associating her with 
Excel USA products were featured prominently in the publications and promotional 
materials of both Excel USA and the Territorial Owners. R. 14230: 86-90. Consumers 
and distributors of Excel USA products associated Dr. Chen with the products. R. 14226: 
39-40. Dr. Chen traveled tirelessly, promoting "nutritional immunology," speaking at 
conventions, directing seminars and conducting training sessions in the countries where 
Excel USA products were sold. R. 14222: 18-19,67-68, 152-53; R. 14293: 185; R. 
14230: 62-63; R. 14339: Ex. 76; R. 14344: Ex. 547. 
3In the first eight months of 2000, Excel USA sold approximately US $20 million 
worth of product (at least US $100 million at retail) on an annualized basis to the 
Territorial owners in Asia. R. 14277: 93-94. For 1999, Excel Taiwan had retail sales of 
approximately US $40 million, and approximately the same amount for the period from 
January through September 2000. R. 14226: 40-42, 125. Excel Malaysia had annual 
sales in 1997 of approximately US $70 million, in 1998 of approximately US $45 million, 
in 1999 of approximately US $45 million, and in 2000 through October 31, of 
approximately US $47 million. R. 14222: 19-22. 
6 
In late 1995, Dr. Chen elected to transfer ownership of Excel USA to her children and 
to also give Ms. Stewart a minority ownership interest. Her gift to Ms. Stewart was an 
expression of appreciation for Ms. Stewart's work with Excel USA and for her help in caring 
for the Zhang Children. R. 14230: 54-56. On December 30, 1995, Dr. Chen endorsed her 
Stock Certificate 0001, transferring her entire 6,000 shares to "various individuals." Id. Ex. 
19. On that date, Excel USA issued four new Certificates, 0002-0005, of 1,500 shares each 
to Ms. Stewart and to each of the Zhang Children in their individual names. Id. Ex. 20. 
Collectively, the Zhang Children then owned a 75% interest in Excel USA. Id. Exs. 19, 20. 
The newly issued Certificates were left in the possession of Lynn Gilbert, a C.P.A. who 
performed accounting services for Excel USA. R. 14228: 56-57.4 
The close association between Dr. Chen, her sister Ms. Stewart and her mother ended 
early in the year 2000, R. 14222: 49, 63; R. 14228: 73, when Ms. Stewart and Madam Chen 
tried to force Dr. Chen to divorce Mr. Zhang. The intensity of their feelings and the methods 
Madam Chen and Ms. Stewart utilized in seeking dominion over Dr. Chen cannot be 
adequately captured in a legal brief. R. 14230: 6-13, 73-75; 14235: 17-18; 14255: 86-88. 
Dr. Chen did not capitulate. R. 14230: 12. 
In the fall of 2000 while Dr. Chen and her husband Mr. Zhang were out of the United 
States, Ms. Stewart purported to remove Dr. Chen and her husband Mr. Zhang as directors 
of Excel USA. R. 14338: Ex. 22. She then purported to appoint her own husband, Taig 
Stewart, and Madam Chen as new directors (with such, collectively, including Ms. Stewart, 
4At the same time, trust documents were presented to Dr. Chen by Mr. Gilbert and 
signed, but no property was placed in trust. R. 14338: Exs. 21, 24. 
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referred to as the "Rogue Board of Directors"). Id. The Rogue Board of Directors, through 
"Action by Written Consent," then purported to remove Dr. Chen as president and her 
husband, Mr. Zhang, as secretary, and to install Ms. Stewart as president and her husband as 
secretary. Id. Ex. 23; R. 14293: 63. Ms. Stewart then proceeded to usurp control of all 
Excel USA operations as its putative president and CEO, until she was removed by the 
Interim Order. R. 14293: 124; R. 14244: 104; R. 14245: 5-9; R. 14255: 10-12. 
Ms. Stewart claimed authority to vote her nephew's and nieces' shares as of 
September 1, 2000, but at such time did not have the Zhang Children's shares in her 
possession. She later obtained possession of the Zhang Children's Certificates as well her 
own Certificate from Mr. Gilbert who personally delivered the Certificates to her in late 
October or early November 2000. R. 14228:56-64. Although Ms. Stewart took possession 
of the Zhang Children's Certificates, the Certificates did not support her claim of authority 
to act because they were titled in the Zhang Children's individual names. To solve this, 
shortly after having obtained the Certificates from Mr. Gilbert, Ms. Stewart claimed she 
"lost" her nieces' and nephew's Certificates (but not her own). She then executed three 
separate Affidavits, each bearing the date December 15,2000, falsely stating she had lost or 
misplaced the Zhang Children's Stock Certificates. Id. Exs. 25, 26,27; see id. Ex. 20. Ms. 
Stewart then caused Excel USA to issue replacement Certificates, replacing the names of the 
Children on the new Certificates with her own name as purported trustee. R. 14338: Ex. 28. 
Perhaps wary of the tenuous nature of this "control" (her nieces and nephew still had 
75% ownership), Ms. Stewart called a "Special Meeting of the [Rogue] Board of Directors," 
8 
purportedly held December 15, 2000, id. Ex. 29, to dilute the ownership interest of the 
putative beneficiaries. At this meeting Excel USA entered into a Stock Subscription 
Agreement with Ms. Stewart for the purpose of issuing an additional 3,200 shares to her so 
that her total shares would be 4,700 (or 51.1 % ownership, as compared with a combined total 
of 4,500 for the Zhang Children, or 48.9 % ownership). Id. Excel USA then issued 
Certificate number 0006, for 3,200 shares, to Ms. Stewart, on December 15,2000,/d. Ex.31, 
purporting to give her personal voting control of Excel USA. For unknown reasons, her 
plans changed. Based upon a "Special Meeting of the [Rogue] Board of Directors," 
purportedly held January 6, 2001, Excel USA released Ms. Stewart from her obligations 
under the Stock Subscription Agreement, Exs. 32, 33, and a new agreement was made 
between Excel USA and Madam Chen for the issuance of 3,200 shares,5 id. Exs. 32, 33, 34, 
so that Ms. Stewart and Madam Chen would together control Excel USA. 
Simultaneously, Ms. Stewart was actively disrupting Excel USA's relationship with 
the Territorial Owners in Asia and undermining Excel USA itself: first, she cut off the flow 
of product to the Territorial Owners in Taiwan and Malaysia in order to weaken the 
distribution systems of the Territorial Owners who accounted for 90% of Excel USA's 
worldwide sales; second, she transferred millions of dollars to Asia to the custody of Richard 
Hu and Sam Tzu, former managers of Territorial Owners, for the purpose of financing the 
establishment of distribution networks to compete with and undermine the existing network 
5Dr. Chen and her attorneys did not learn about the "mischief associated with 
reissuing the Zhang Children's shares in Ms. Stewart's name and the Stock Subscription 
Agreements until after Dr. Chen commenced the litigation. R. 523-24. The shares 
contemplated to be issued to Madam Chen were never issued. 
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("Rogue Distributors"); third, she caused millions of dollars in stolen Excel USA product to 
be shipped to the Rogue Distributors, depleting Excel USA's assets and cash-flow, 
undercutting Excel USA's sales and damaging Excel USA's and the Territorial Owners' 
good will; fourth, when it became evident that Ms. Stewart would lose control of Excel USA, 
she sabotaged and converted substantial quantities of Excel USA property, including 
intellectual property;/?/?/?, she established (with Madam Chen's assistance) an entity known 
as Apogee (on the broken back of Excel USA), to manufacture and distribute the same types 
of health supplements Excel USA manufactured and distributed for the purpose of competing 
with Excel USA, principally in the Asian markets.6 Further information on each of these 
events is now provided. 
B. UNLAWFUL EFFORTS TO REPLACE TERRITORIAL 
OWNERS AND TO DESTROY EXCEL USA. 
1. CUT OFF OF PRODUCT TO TERRITORIAL OWNERS. 
After usurping control, Ms. Stewart instructed Excel USA employees to not ship 
pending orders of product to the Territorial Owners in Malaysia and Taiwan. R. 14244: 87-
89. Excel USA did not fill or ship confirmed orders of product to the Territorial Owners in 
6Ms. Stewart also brought litigation in Hong Kong against Dr. Chen, Dr. Chen's 
husband and others in case no. 558 of 2001 in the High Court of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region, Court of the First Instance, which was dismissed under a Master 
Settlement Agreement dated May 29, 2001, R. 14346: Ex. 534; and in case no. 2493 of 
2001, which was dismissed pursuant to a Judgment dated August 30, 2001 (the "Hong 
Kong Case"). Ms. Stewart submitted a number of sworn Affirmations in those parallel 
proceedings which were admitted in these proceedings as admissions against interest, for 
impeachment or both, as further discussed below. 
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either Malaysia7 or Taiwan8 from approximately September 2000 to March 2001. Ms. 
Stewart confirmed receipt of orders from the Territorial Owners to deceive them from 
realizing that product shipments had been cut off until late in the fall 2000. R. 14244: 121-
23; R. 14245:66-67,37-41. The consequences were devastating in that by January 15,2001, 
Excel Malaysia's traditional five-month inventory supply was essentially depleted, and it 
found itself in the position of having received orders and payments for product from down-
line distributors but unable to fill the orders. R. 14222: 32-36; R. 14338: Ex. 2. The refusal 
7Excel Malaysia, in accordance with established practice, R. 14222: 23-24, 27, 
146-51, submitted four orders in September 2000 for Excel USA products, and Ms. 
Stewart confirmed receipt in the amount of US $1.45 million, but did not ship the orders. 
R. 14222: 24-25, 56-57, 61-64; R. 14338: Ex. 3. Excel Malaysia submitted four orders in 
October 2000 for Excel USA products, and Ms. Stewart also confirmed receipt in the 
amount of US $1.55 million, see, e.g. R. 14343: Ex. 406; R. 14341: Ex. 228 (Addendum 
G and H), but did not fill the orders. R. 14222: 24-25, 57-58, 64; R. 14338: Ex. 4. Excel 
Malaysia similarly submitted four orders for Excel USA products in the amount of U.S. 
$1.8 million in November 2000 but received no confirmation, and Excel USA did not fill 
these orders. R. 14222: 26, 64. By January 1, 2001, Excel Malaysia had 12 outstanding 
orders for Excel USA product that Ms. Stewart had refused to allow Excel USA to fill. R. 
14222: 24; R. 14338: Exs. 3, 4. 
8Excel Taiwan's situation was similar. Consistent with the established practice, R. 
14226: 44-45, 107, 109; R. 14293: 178, Excel Taiwan submitted five orders for Excel 
USA product during October 2000 in the amount of US $441,440.86, and Ms. Stewart 
confirmed receipt, but did not fill the confirmed orders. R. 14226: 54-55, 58-60; R. 
14339: Ex. 41. Excel Taiwan submitted five product orders in November 2000 to Excel 
USA in the total amount of US $460,895.61, and Ms. Stewart confirmed receipt but did 
not fill these orders. R. 14226: 54-55, 58-61; R. 14339: Ex. 42. On January 2, 2001, 
Excel Taiwan submitted four product orders to Excel USA in the amount of US 
$79,940.20. Ms. Stewart confirmed receipt and represented that the shipment would 
consist of 18 pallets of product, but she did not fill these orders. R. 14226: 54-55, 58-61; 
R. 14339: Exs. 44, 48. 
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to ship to Excel Taiwan had similar devastating effects on Excel Taiwan. R. 14226: 52-54.9 
Ms. Stewart's strategy was in part intended to cause down-line distributors of the 
Territorial Owners to defect to the Rogue Distributors who had served as managers for the 
Territorial Owners in The Philippines and in Hong Kong. R. 14247:20-35,37-41; R. 14341: 
Ex. 228, at 6, 22 (Addendum H).10 Ms. Stewart's actions caused Excel USA to breach its 
exclusive distribution contracts with Excel Taiwan, Excel Malaysia, Excel Hong Kong and 
Excel Philippines, see R. 14338: Ex. 1; 14339: Ex. 38, leaving these entities without any 
available source ofExcel USA's products. R. 14300; R. 14317, ^[71. Ms. Stewart thereby 
exposed Excel USA to the risk of many millions of dollars in damages. R. 14300. 
2. TRANSFER OF MILLIONS TO ESTABLISH ROGUE 
DISTRIBUTORS. 
Ms. Stewart recruited Messrs. Hu and Tzu to establish Rogue Distributors in The 
Philippines, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and elsewhere. R. 14245: 17, 20-34; R. 14247: 117-21. 
To effect this part of her scheme, Ms. Stewart used what were ostensibly third-party bank 
accounts she had been instrumental in establishing. One of these accounts was in her 
9There was no shortage of product to fill the confirmed orders from Excel 
Malaysia and Excel Taiwan. The products shipped to Messrs. Hu and Tzu (Rogue 
Distributors) were the same products Messrs. Le and Tjandra had historically ordered. R. 
14293: 158; R. 14245:21-22. 
10Parenthetically, Ms. Stewart caused certain adulterated product to be shipped and 
it arrived in Taiwan on January 9, 2001. Mr. Le was concerned that Excel USA, under 
Ms. Stewart's guidance, was changing the manufacturing and expiration dates on 
products, so he wanted quality assurance. If the products were contaminated or of poor 
quality, distributors would refuse to purchase product and the entire network would 
suffer. Mr. Le hired a laboratory to conduct testing on the products. Based upon the 
testing, Mr. Le returned the product to Excel USA. R. 14226: 70-78, 116-17. 
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Taiwanese aunt's name and one was in her Taiwanese uncle's name. The accounts were 
established at Central Bank in Provo, Utah.11 Substantial sums were deposited into those 
accounts ($8 million or more). She wired substantial amounts from these accounts to Messrs. 
Hu and Tzu for use in establishing the Rogue Distributors.12 
3. SHIPMENT OF STOLEN PRODUCT TO ROGUE DISTRIBUTORS. 
Ms. Stewart shipped Excel USA products to the Rogue Distributors in The 
Philippines, Hong Kong and Taiwan, without even a pretext for payment, at the time Excel 
USA had exclusive contracts with others (and supposedly was experiencing severe cash flow 
problems). R. 14293: 128-132; R. 14245: 53). R. 14244: 66-77, 105-106; R. 14341: Exs. 
11
 Ms. Stewart attempted to conceal her activities through the use of nominees. Her 
use of nominees is characteristic of her business dealings. This practice is illustrated by 
her use of her aunt and uncle to establish bank accounts after having persuaded Dr. Chen 
to assist her, saying the accounts were set up for the aunt's and uncle's benefit. R. 14293: 
110. This is also illustrated by the use of Mr. Uy to front for the Rogue Distributor in The 
Philippines and to serve as its nominal owner. Mr. Hu would "loan" money for an 
"unknown" purpose, so if anyone ever questioned the loan, it would not lead back to Ms. 
Stewart. Utilizing a front person "was the intention, yes." R. 14245: 50; R. 14340: Ex. 
104, 276-77. Another example of Ms. Stewart's practice was the use of her friend's 
name, Ms. Shen, and her home address, to open a bank account through which Ms. 
Stewart and her mother funneled millions of dollars used to establish Apogee. R. 14344: 
Ex. 528; R. 14264:5-10,76-79. 
,2Ms. Stewart caused monies to be wired at least as follows: on November 30, 
2000, $100,000 was wired from her uncle's account to Mr. Tzu. R. 14342: Ex. 274, 
attachment B; on December 12, 2000, $1,200,000 was wired from her uncle's account to 
Mr. Tzu. R. 14342: Ex. 274, attachment B; on December 19, 2000, $400,000 was wired 
from her aunt's account to Mr. Hu. R. 14342: Ex. 274, attachment C; on December 19, 
2000, $1,000,000 was wired from her aunt's account to Mr. Tzu. R. 14342: Ex. 274, 
attachment C. Ms. Stewart was listed on the wire instructions as the "contact person." R. 
14230: 51-53; R. 14250: 21-25, 30-33; R.14342: Ex. 274A. 
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205, 207, 214, 216 and 217.13 R. 14245: 23, 32.14 
Concealed shipments were also made. Ms. Stewart caused Shannon River, a nominee 
company purportedly owned by Taig Stewart's sister, Shannon Heaton, to export stolen 
Excel USA products to Rogue Distributors. R. 14341:Exs.214,216,217 I5 Under direction 
from Ms. Stewart, Ms. Barclay caused Shannon River to ship Excel USA products to Mr. 
Tzu. These shipments were to be used to undermine the sales of Excel USA and the 
13Ms. Stewart denied that she was aware of specific shipments bound for the Rogue 
Distributors, R. 14245: 29, but the trial court found that denial wholly unconvincing, 
given that all product orders were received at a fax machine in Ms. Stewart's locked 
office and were not released to anyone else until Ms. Stewart personally reviewed and 
approved the orders. See R. 14254: 234; R. 14244: 54, 57; R. 14245: 59-60. 
l4The first shipment to Mr. Tzu was invoiced December 29, 2001, to Extra Excel 
International (HK) Limited. The shipment was loaded on ship in Los Angeles on January 
15, 2001, but remained in the control of Excel USA and could have been stopped or 
redirected The invoiced amount was HK $914,916.75. R. 14245: 9-15; R. 14341: Ex. 
205. Ms. Stewart did not re-call or redirect the shipment represented by Exhibit 205 at 
any time. The shipment to Richard Hu was invoiced January 5, 2001 to Excellent 
Essentials International Corp. The shipment was loaded on ship in Los Angeles on 
January 19, 2001, but remained in the control of Excel USA and could have been stopped 
or redirected. The invoiced amount was US $830,752.50. R. 14341: Ex. 207. Ms. 
Stewart did not re-call this shipment represented by Exhibit 207 at any time. 
,5Shannon River never had a directors meeting. R. 14317:107. It had no 
agreement, written or otherwise, with Excel USA that it would serve as an exporter for or 
on behalf of Excel USA. Ms. Barclay identified Ms. Stewart's home address as that of 
Shannon River on the invoices to Mr. Tzu. After her scheme was exposed, Ms. Stewart 
claimed that the Shannon River entity belonged to Excel USA, and not to Shannon 
Heaton. She further claimed that Excel USA owned the accounts receivable that were in 
the name of Shannon River, which included the right to collect on the invoices 
represented by R. 14341: Exs. 214, 216 and 217. No records at Excel USA existed that 
would corroborate Ms. Stewart's claim. The Shannon River bank account also identified 
Ms. Stewart's home address as that of Shannon River, and she received Shannon River 
bank statements at her home and did not forward them to Excel USA until she found out 
that Excel USA had learned of the invoices represented in R. 14341: Exs. 214, 216 and 
217. R. 14250:52-59, 156-57. 
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Territorial Owners by "dumping" the product in strategic markets. R. 14244:66-77,110-11; 
R. 14341: Exs. 214, 216 and 217.16 
Prior to leaving Excel USA, Ms. Barclay removed from her computer all files 
referencing or relating to Shannon River and she took from Excel USA's premises all 
Shannon River records. R. 14341: Exs. 214, 216 and 217. Two or three weeks later, Ms. 
Barclay delivered all of the Shannon River documents and files to Ms. Stewart at her home. 
She explained she gave the documents and records to Ms. Stewart because, "it is not under 
E. Excel letter head, and because I don't know what everything went on, so I just give to her 
and have her take care of it." She claims she did not talk with Ms. Stewart when she 
delivered the documents, except to say, "[h]ere it is." R. 14244: 114, 119-120, 124-26.17 
16The evidence of concealment and intentional misappropriation by Ms. Stewart 
utilizing Shannon River is overwhelming and unrebutted. On February 23, 2001, 
Shannon River, 1966 S. Laguna Vista Drive, Orem, Utah, 84058 (the address to Ms. 
Stewart's home), invoiced Rich Universe Limited (Mr. Tzu) in Hong Kong for Excel 
USA product in the amount of HK $283,545.52 together with another invoice for what 
appears to be HK $32,769.64. The freight-forwarder received the shipment the same day. 
Both Ms. Stewart and Ms. Barclay believe Excel USA received the order from Mr. Tzu or 
his office approximately one to four weeks before the shipment was invoiced. R. 14244: 
66-71, 110-11; R. 14245: 52-53; R. 14341: Exs. 214 and 215. On February 28, 2001, 
Shannon River, 1966 S. Laguna Vista Drive, Orem Utah, 84058, invoiced Rich Universe 
Limited (Mr. Tzu) in Hong Kong for Excel USA product in the amount of HK 
$205,920.00. Ms. Barclay would not say whether the order came in to Excel USA before 
or after February 21, 2001; she testified orders typically came in one to four weeks before 
products were invoiced and shipped. The freight-forwarder received the shipment the 
same day. R. 14244: 100-103; R. 14341: Exs. 215 and 216. On March 6, 2001, Shannon 
River, 1966 S. Laguna Vista Drive, Orem, Utah, 84058, invoiced Nation Joy Leather 
Products Co. of Taipei, Taiwan (Mr. Tzu), for Excel USA product in the amount of US 
$4,991.41. The freight-forwarder received the shipment the same day. R. 14341: Ex. 
217. 
I7If not for the fortuitous mention of Shannon River's name by one of the staff at 
Excel USA, this part of the scheme may never have been discovered. R. 14256: 120-21. 
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Excel USA received no payment or consideration for the Excel USA's products that 
Ms. Stewart shipped to Messrs. Hu and Tzu. She made no effort to arrange with Messrs. Hu 
and Tzu for payment for this product or to create any record showing Excel USA was owed 
money. R. 14245: 6-20, 28-32, 103-04. Ms. Barclay did not prepare any invoices from 
Excel USA to Shannon River and did not account for these shipments in any way on the 
records of Excel USA. R. 14244:76-77, 110-11;R. 14341: Exs. 214, 216 and 217. 
4. SABOTAGE OF EXCEL USA. 
As a result of the evidence presented in the First Preliminary Injunction Hearing, it 
became clear "there was a strong possibility that Jau-Hwa would be removed as president of 
the company," R. 14262: 188. Faced with likely loss of control, Ms. Stewart tried to destroy 
Excel USA by orchestrating a number of events calculated to deliberately damage and 
disrupt Excel USA's operations.18 Some of what she did follows. 
Beverly Warner, an employee loyal to Ms. Stewart,19 turned off the surveillance 
system that recorded activity at Excel USA, R. 14252: 56, 96, 160-70; R. 14248: 14, which 
made it possible for Ms. Stewart and her cohorts to commit acts of sabotage and theft at 
The documents and files were not returned nor was any effort made by Ms. Stewart to 
notify Excel USA of the existence of such documents and files. 
18The trial court found that all of the surreptitious events explained below were 
carried out by persons acting under Ms. Stewart's direction and control, on her behalf and 
in her stead as her agents or nominees. R. 14317: ^ f 114. 
19Sometime prior to the entry of the Interim Order, Ms. Warner told another Excel 
USA employee, "I would go to jail for Jau-hwa"; "I would lie for her"; and, "If the 
company is awarded to Jau-Fei, I'm out the door." R. 14244: 182. 
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Excel USA's premises without the risk that such activities would be caught on camera. 
Ms. Warner conducted the first known of the many suspicious document removals 
from Excel USA's offices in late January 2001, by removing numerous documents from the 
Excel USA facility and delivering them to Ms. Stewart's residence. She did not return any 
of such documents to Excel USA. R. 14252: 66-69; R. 14286: 3-4. 
To substantiate her pretextual assertion that Excel USA had no written contracts with 
the Territorial Owners in Taiwan and Malaysia (purportedly relieving her of the obligation 
to ship product to them), Ms. Stewart, in the latter part of January 2001, caused Ms. Warner 
to remove Excel USA's written contracts with the Territorial Owners from Excel USA's 
files. R. 14248: 26-31, 39-40,69-70. Ms. Stewart secreted the contracts in her own files off 
of Excel USA's premises and refused to produce them to Excel USA until February 2002. 
R. 5828: Ex. F.21 
20Although Ms. Warner claimed her reason for turning off the surveillance system 
was because the available video tapes were worn out, the court found that explanation 
was not credible for a number of reasons: there was a full box of approximately 100 new, 
unopened tapes in the surveillance room. R. 14252: 167; R. 14254: 169-70, 196; Ms. 
Warner never replaced the tapes nor turned the system back on during the remainder of 
her tenure at Excel USA, R. 14252: 66, despite the "highly unusual" events as set forth 
below. SeeR. 14252: 60-70; R. 14252: 22; R. 14254: 114-16; and R. 14252: 155-56, 
171. 
21Ms. Stewart's testimony during the First Preliminary Injunction Hearing created 
the false impression that Ms. Stewart had no knowledge of the existence of the contracts 
or, if they existed, where they were located. In this regard, Ms. Stewart said she had 
conducted a search in order to locate any contracts with Excel Malaysia and Excel 
Taiwan and that she "could not find any record of any kind of contract." R. 14293: 133-
35. Ms. Stewart also gave the false impression that shipments to the Territorial Owners 
in Taiwan and Malaysia would resume if they simply signed "new" contracts with Excel 
USA. R. 14339: Ex. 45. Ms. Stewart's assertion was revealed as a pretext by her lawyers 
in correspondence to counsel in Hong Kong: "The client has no objection to your dealing 
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The proof of theft and destruction of documents and records was substantial and 
unrebutted.22 The theft and destruction was carried out in various ways. For example, Mary 
Spencer, an Excel USA employee, properly assisted lawyers representing Ms. Stewart and 
Excel USA in assembling and removing documents from the premises for discovery 
purposes. R. 14262: 60-63; R. 14286: 3-4; R. 14252: 67-68. She testified the documents 
assembled and removed were not what was returned.23 
Electronic records were also deleted. Ms. Warner deleted electronic data, such as e-
mails to and from Ms. Stewart, and other electronic files from employees' computers. 
R. 14262: 186-90; R. 14254: 203-10, 219-20,233; R. 14286: 132, 138-39; R. 14244: 156.24 
A large quantity of Excel USA documents and property was removed or 
with [Sam or Jason Tzu] because the existing distributor will not be given the opportunity 
to enter into the new distributorship agreement you are reviewing'' R. 14345: Ex. 572, at 
2 (emphasis supplied). 
22See also R. 2962, 2866, 2844, 2832, 2825, 2822, 2816, 2811, 2807, 2798, 2957, 
2793, 2790, 2787, 2783, 2838, 3670 and 3416, Affidavits and Exhibits setting forth the 
specific documents and types of documents that went missing. (See Addendum E.) 
23Ms. Spencer reported substantial and pervasive discrepancies between what the 
boxes contained when they were taken and what was in the boxes when they were 
returned. With respect to the first boxes returned, Ms. Spencer testified that the "things 
that had been sent off were useable files that were current or within the year that I kept in 
my office. . . . The things that came back were five and six and seven years o ld . . . . I 
started organizing them in my office by year, and that's how I found out that there wasn't 
complete years of anything." R. 14246: 70-71. The second group of returned boxes had 
even more documents missing. According to Ms. Spencer, "those boxes had things like 
old telephone books and just old Sunrider sample stuff and catalogs." R. 14246: 66. 
24Ms. Stewart's explanation for deleting the computer files was to "protect" 
employees in the event there was new management, and to prevent Dr. Chen's attorneys 
from accessing the information. R. 14254: 118-20; R. 14244: 150-52, 156; R. 14286: 
132, 138-39; R. 14262: 187, a clear example of spoliation. 
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"disappeared" from the Excel USA facility, as inventoried by Excel USA employees in 
Addendum E. R.14344: 66-72.25 
Ms. Stewart, also during February 2001, instructed an employee to file original 
product registrations in Taiwan, Malaysia and The Philippines in Ms. Stewart's name 
personally, and to switch the U.S. registrations to "her personal name instead of the 
company's name." R. 14244: 158-59.26 
Ms. Spencer discovered the non-compete agreements that Excel USA employees 
were required to sign had been removed from employees' personnel files. The files were 
kept in Ms. Spencer's office, and Ms. Warner and Ms. Stewart were the only persons, beside 
Ms. Spencer, with keys. R. 14262: 54-60, 114; R. 14252: 64; R. 14252: 40.27 
Taig Stewart removed the items set forth in R. 14344: Ex. 523 (Addendum F), and 
25Such items included computer equipment, office furniture, fax machines, 
televisions and VCRs, file cabinets, desks and chairs, scientific reports (analytical reports, 
processing reports, toxicology reports, stability studies and laboratory reports) that were 
kept in Ms. Stewart's office that was "always locked" when Ms. Stewart was not present, 
and large quantities of product labels. R. 14245: 122-23; R. 14244: 136-37; R. 14286: 
127. 
26Also during February 2001, Ms. Stewart had Gina Lipe (or "Ms. Lipe"), another 
Excel USA employee, take three boxes of files from Ms. Stewart's office to her car, R. 
14286: 124-25, and had Ms. Lipe stay late into the evening to pull all of Excel USA's 
original wire payment and invoice records for individual material suppliers. She has not 
seen them since. R. 14286: 125-27. 
27When told of the missing agreements, Ms. Warner told Ms. Spencer "not [to] 
worry about it. They weren't binding anyway." R. 14262: 56-57. Less than two months 
later, Ms. Warner, Taig Stewart, Dale Stewart, Ms. Barclay and Brian Hymas were all 
overtly working on behalf of Ms. Stewart's Apogee enterprise. Ms. Stewart herself 
admitted that those individuals would not legally have been able to provide her any 
assistance under the terms of the noncompetition agreements. R. 14250: 129; R. 14252: 
69. 
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stored most of such in the seven-car garage he and his wife used.28 He also removed every 
paper file from his office, which consisted of approximately a dozen boxes, and placed them 
in the basement of the residence where he lived with Ms. Stewart and Madam Chen. R. 
14255: 25, 28. Mr. Hymas29 removed additional property belonging to Excel USA.30 
Ms. Stewart, with the help of others, removed 20 to 30 boxes of documents which 
soon joined the dozen boxes removed by Taig Stewart in the basement of the residence 
where the Stewarts lived. R. 14255: 27-29.31 
Dale Stewart and Ms. Barclay removed property of Excel USA from the Excel USA 
28In addition to the items of furniture, computer hardware and software and other 
personal property, he took substantial quantities of intellectual property (photography, 
graphics, archives, CD-ROMs, computer programs) and royalty-free stock photography 
that had been, purchased by Excel USA and which Excel USA had, over the years, used in 
its publications, designs and promotional material. Brian Hymas, an Excel USA 
employee under Taig Stewart's supervision, assisted. All of the items were the property 
of Excel USA. Most of the equipment he and Mr. Hymas removed from Excel USA's 
premises was stored in the seven-car garage at the home where Ms. Stewart, her husband 
and her mother were living. Ms. Stewart regularly used that garage, as did her husband. 
R. 14255:24-26,31, 107-08, 126-30, 134; R. 14262: 11-28,46. 
29Taig Stewart described Mr. Hymas as a good friend of Ms. Stewart's family and 
"like a little brother" to Mr. Stewart himself. R. 14255: 62. 
30He removed two Epson 9000 printers, a personal computer, company files that 
were on the computer, an art table, a laminator, scissors and knives, and similar items 
from Excel USA's art department. R. 14252: 158; R. 14255: 62-63; R. 14262: 27. The 
printers along with other items he removed were also kept in the seven-car garage. R. 
14255: 62-63; R. 14262: 17, 26-27, 46. 
31Ms. Stewart removed all of the files from her office with the assistance of Mr. 
Hymas. She did not distinguish between personal and company files. R. 14250: 139-43. 
Ms. Stewart testified on November 27, 2001, during the OSC Hearings, wherein she 
admitted that ^ 41 of her Third Affirmation in the Hong Kong Case (Addendum G)—the 
assertion that she had never ordered anyone to remove records belonging to the company-
-was false. R. 14250: 140-41. 
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facility. R.14262: 123-42; R. 14295: 130-35; R. 14341: Ex. 215/2 
The 74 cactus freezers containing perishable products were unplugged, turned off, or 
turned "down," and when this problem was corrected one day, similar sabotage was repeated. 
R. 14257: 63-65, 78-79. 
Commencing February 17,2001, Ms. Stewart's sister, Ms. Smith, leased a portion of 
a warehouse (the "ATL Warehouse") for $132,000,33 located near Excel USA's offices. R. 
14342: Ex. 278.34 Beginning at approximately 3:00 or 4:00 p.m. on Sunday February 18, 
2001, and throughout the course of that afternoon, evening and into the next morning, 
approximately six individuals were involved in delivering pallets of Excel USA product to 
32Dale Stewart testified at the OSC Hearings that he had assisted Ms. Barclay in 
carrying at the most "three or four" boxes to her home. R. 14295: 130-32. On February 
23, 2001, however, he assisted Ms. Barclay in transporting approximately 16 boxes from 
Excel USA's premises to Ms. Barclay's home. R. 14341: 215, at 10-11. He claims that 
he did not know what was in the boxes. R. 14295: 130-32. 
33In her initial Answer to the Third-Party Complaint, Ms. Smith implicated her 
mother Madam Chen in her decision to rent the facility, "affirmatively alleging] that she 
was asked to lease the warehouse by her mother . . . and that she was not given an 
explanation as to the purpose of the warehouse." R. 5607, ^ j 51. Two weeks later, Ms. 
Smith had a change of heart, and attempted to distance her mother from the lease 
transaction. (From September 1, 2000 to February 21, 2001, Madam Chen purported to 
serve as a director-and fiduciary—of Excel USA.) In her deposition, Ms. Smith said the 
lease had "[njothing to do with any family member." Instead, she asserted she had rented 
the facility for use as a salad dressing factory. R. 14257: 32-33, 51. Ms. Smith also 
admitted she had never acquired manufacturing equipment or raw materials, never used 
the warehouse for making salad dressing, never hired an architect or structural engineer, 
never talked with anyone about zoning ordinances governing use of the warehouse, and 
that the one-year lease provided insufficient time to recoup the investment in a capital-
intensive manufacturing operation because the rental price of $132,000 was "too 
expensive." R. 14257: 32, 41- 46. 
34Shortly after the lease was entered, windows in the leased portion of the ATL 
Warehouse were covered with dark material to prevent looking inside. R 14262: 143. 
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the ATL Warehouse in Excel USA's trucks. R. 14262: 130-135.3' 
The calculated, unlimited efforts to discredit and destroy even included having another 
"loyal" employee, Mr. Hymas, place a number of rodents in the Excel USA warehouse, after 
the fact, as a pretext36 to justify the prior removal of Excel USA product to the ATL 
Warehouse, and to jeopardize Excel USA's relationship with the FDA. R. 14245: 113-15; 
R. 14254: 113-16, 243; R. 14343: Ex. 415, at 78; R. 14262: 237-38, 241; R. 14257: 55, 69, 
72;R.14252: 10 
5. COMPETITION WITH EXCEL USA. 
Madam Chen provided Ms. Stewart millions of dollars to assist her in establishing 
Apogee. The steps taken, all through nominees, included setting up Apogee, purchasing 
land, constructing a manufacturing facility, and acquiring manufacturing equipment. Ms. 
Stewart also used agents including Dale Stewart, Ms. Barclay, Ms. Warner, Mr. Hymas and 
TaigStewart. R. 14245: 79-95;R. 14250:79-82,129-131;R. 14247: 145-97;R. 14264: 11-
56, 63-78; R. 14341: Ex. 262. 
^Approximately 125 pallets of Excel USA products were moved to the ATL 
Warehouse. R. 14262: 123-42; see also 14341: Ex. 215 (establishing transfer of product 
from the ATL Warehouse via semi truck/trailer to an exporter on February 21, 2001, for 
shipment to a Rogue Distributor); R. 14262: 143, 145-47, 157-58. 
36It was not company procedure to remove product from a warehouse when rodents 
were found. R. 14343: Ex. 415, at 78; R. 14264: 241. Moreover, there was no evidence 
of rodents in Excel USA's warehouse prior to the removal of product. R. 14257: 72. The 
type of product that was removed-all in glass bottles or steal drums-was not subject to 
rodent infestation. R. 14252: 10; R. 14262: 216. Finally, Ms. Warner left the facility 
without setting the alarms to accommodate Mr. Hymas' placement of the domesticated 
rodents, which were found there in large numbers the next day. R. 14257: 55, 62, 69; R. 
14262: 237-38; R. 14254: 114-16. 
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Outside professionals having relationships with Excel USA were recruited to join Ms. 
Stewart shortly after this date.37 Ms. Stewart also used Excel USA employee Dale Stewart 
(while he was employed with Excel USA), to begin acquiring equipment for manufacturing 
food-type materials, including capsule products. R. 14247: 144-46.38 When purchased, this 
equipment was delivered to the ATL Warehouse. R. 14295: 105; R. 14250: 77-81; R. 
14247: 145-97; R. 14341: Ex. 262; R. 14295: 95-105, 173; R. 14247: 166. 
Ms. Stewart selected a site on which to construct the new manufacturing facility. R. 
14250: 62-63; R. 14252: 107-36; R. 14343: Ex. 419.39 
Westland Construction (or "Westland") was hired as the general contractor for what 
would be known as the "Scenic West" project. R. 14249:14-18; R. 14249:15-18; R. 14249: 
37Immediately following Ms. Stewart's removal, Dr. Murray, a professor at BYU 
and a paid consultant for Excel USA, immediately tendered his resignation as Associate 
Research Director for Excel USA. R. 14257: 97-99, R. 14344: Ex. 524. On February 26, 
2001, Dr. O'Neill, also a professor at BYU and a paid consultant for Excel USA, faxed a 
letter terminating his consulting agreement with Excel USA. R. 14257: 131-34. 
38Beginning in April 2001, Madam Chen gave Dale Stewart approximately $3,000 
cash per month. She would hand him the cash in an envelope, approximately $1,500 
every two weeks or so. R. 14295: 121-23. Dale Stewart was deposed on November 15, 
2001. During his deposition, he lied by not disclosing that he had been receiving 
approximately $3,000 cash per month beginning April 2001 from Madam Chen. He later 
admitted the lie. R. 14295: 115-16. 
390n March 5, 2001, $3,439 million was wired into the nominee Central Bank 
account in the name of a friend of Ms. Stewart, Ms. Shen. R. 14264: 10-11, 16-18, 20-24; 
R. 14344: Ex. 528 (bates AP 901). On March 12, 2001, $1,209,144.14 was wire 
transferred out, R. 14344: Ex. 528, for the purchase of approximately ten acres of land by 
nominee Lung Chaum Kuo. Ms. Stewart personally negotiated the purchase of this 
property. R. 14250: 65-67; R. 14264: 12-14; R. 14343: Exs. 419, 420, 421, 428 (bates 
AP901);R. 14252: 107-36. 
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5-19, 21-22, 30-31, 45-47, 95, 97-99; R. 14250: 67-71; R. 14343: Ex. 419.40 
On April 17, 2001, at Ms. Stewart's instruction, Ms. Warner applied with the State 
of Utah to reserve the name "Apogee, Inc." R. 14262: 10-12; R. 14250: 83-86; R. 14252: 
73-76; R. 14248: 9-11; R. 14255: 18; R. 14343: Ex. 400.41 On May 10, 2001, Ms. Stewart 
caused Scott Tawzer ("Mr. Tawzer") to set up Apogee. R. 14250: 81-83,42 In June or July 
2001, Apogee revealed its product line.43 
40Westland was paid in a manner calculated to disguise Ms. Stewart's involvement. 
R. 14249: 22-28, 93-94, 100, 110; R. 14343: Exs. 425 and 426. The facility Ms. Stewart 
caused Westland to construct consisted of approximately 100,000 square feet. 
41Messrs. Hu and Tzu at Ms. Stewart's direction registered the Apogee name and 
the trademark in The Philippines and Hong Kong respectively. R. 14245: 82-85. 
42Mr. Tawzer was Bryan Hymas' brother-in-law. He was induced to play the same 
nominee role with respect to Apogee that Ms. Heaton had played with respect to Shannon 
River. R. 14245: 86-89; R. 14250: 82-83, 88-92. At Taig Stewart's request, Westland 
hired the roofing company Scott Tawzer owned to be the roofing subcontractor for the 
Scenic West warehouse construction. R. 14249: 19-21. 
430n July 24, 2001, Ms. Stewart signed her Third Affirmation in the Hong Kong 
Case in which she stated: 
This brings me to the . . . allegations that I was setting up "competing" businesses 
in various Asian countries. Such an allegation is misleading. I have never 
established any business that competed with the Plaintiff, but rather, when I was 
president, I established on behalf of this Plaintiff new distribution companies in 
Hong Kong and the Philippines. 
Addendum G, f^ 37 (emphasis supplied). On August 1, 2001, Ms. Stewart signed her 
Fourth Affirmation in the Hong Kong Case. Ms. Stewart stated therein: 
Mr. Holman also accused me of setting up a competing business, yet he was 
unable to produce any evidence when requested by my attorneys. Indeed, I live 15 
minutes away from the Corporation's offices, and if I were setting up any 
competing business in Utah, surely he would have little difficulty in obtaining 
substantial evidence. . . . 
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Taig Stewart became the art director for Apogee, filling the same position he had at 
Excel USA. He designed Apogee's logo and the labels for the Apogee products. R. 14295: 
107-10; R. 14255: 13-14,16-18,116-17,139; R. 14344: Ex. 529 (Bates AP000778-79); R. 
14343: Ex. 417. 
On August 15, 2001, Mr. Tawzer signed an "Exclusive Contract" with Ultimate 
Formulations, Inc. dba Best Formulations ("Best") a California company. The contract 
appointed Best as the exclusive contract manufacturer of Apogee products. R. 14344: Ex. 
529 (bates AP000892). Best would contract-manufacture products until Apogee's 
manufacturing facility came on line. R. 14250: 113-16; R. 14247: 52-53; R. 14256: 59-60. 
In an "Exclusive Contract," notarized by Ms. Warner on September 5, 2001, Mr. 
Tawzer granted Apogee Essence International Philippines, Inc., Mr. Hu's company, the 
exclusive right to distribute Apogee's products in The Philippines. R. 14344: Ex. 529. 
In early October 2001, Drs. O'Neill and Murray, on behalf of Apogee, traveled to 
Best's manufacturing facility in California for an inspection. R. 14250: 113-16; R. 14247: 
52-53; R. 14256: 59-60. They also traveled to Malaysia, Singapore, The Philippines, Hong 
Kong, and Taiwan where they met with the same people they had met with during their trip 
inJune2001.44 R. 137-38; R. 14257: 106-09. 
Addendum H, ^ 42 (emphasis supplied). Ms. Stewart later acknowledged that at the time 
she signed her Fourth Affirmation, she was in the middle of setting up a competing 
business in Utah, and at that time the land had been purchased, the building was under 
construction, she had ordered equipment and raw materials, and she had organized 
Apogee. R. 14250: at 38-39. 
44During June 2001, Drs. O'Neill and Murray traveled together to Malaysia, 
Singapore, The Philippines, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Mr. Hu and Excellent Essentials 
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A promotional brochure for USA Apogee, R. 14341: Ex. 252, was released in the fall 
of 2001. The brochure utilized photographs Excel USA had purchased and previously used 
in its advertisements and publications, and were part of the Excel USA intellectual property 
Taig Stewart had taken from Excel USA's premises. The brochure provided: 
Established in 2001, USA Apogee is a multinational health products company. It is 
founded by a group of scientists, specialist doctors and seasoned marketing 
professionals. Our scientists come from a wide spectrum of scientific fields, namely, 
biochemistry, nutrition, immunology and Phytonutrition. 
USA Apogee is based in Springville, Utah, USA, an area listed by the US government 
as a wildlife protection zone. It is pristine with no pollution from the outside world. 
Not only is it endowed with fresh air and clean water, it has also a most agreeable 
climate. 
The brochure gave biographical information on Apogee's consultants, Drs. O'Neill and 
Murray. And, the brochure displayed and extolled the physiological virtues of nine capsule 
products Apogee would be marketing. R. 14255: 31-45; R. 14341: Ex. 253a.45 
Shortly before Thanksgiving of 2001, Mr. Tzu ordered Apogee products through Ms. 
Warner for shipment to Taiwan. Ms. Warner arranged with Best to manufacture nine 
separate products and a total of 80,000 Apogee product units (bottles), that were sent to 
(Philippines) had invited them to The Philippines, and Jason Tzu, Mr. Tzu's brother, had 
invited them to Hong Kong. R. 14257: 147-51, 173. 
450n September 17, 2001, a paid commercial aired on television in The Philippines 
relating to Apogee Essence International Phils., Inc. ("Apogee Essence"). The paid 
commercial contained images of Excel USA products. R. 14254: 89-91; R. 14343: 
Exs. 423, 423A. As of September 29, 2001, Excel USA products that had been 
manufactured by Excel USA at 1198 North Spring Creek, Springville, Utah were 
available for distribution through Apogee Essence without Excel USA's approval. 
R. 14254: 91-92; R. 14254: 95-101, 103; R. 14343: Ex. 424. 
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Taiwan. R. 14252: 84-88, 220-21; R.14248: 5-7; R. 14265: 68-69; R. 14344: Ex.529.46 
C. COURT ORDERS. 
1. TRO. 
The TRO obtained by Dr. Chen on January 10, 2001, provides in part: 
The Defendant Stewart, her agents . . . are enjoined and restrained: . . . (2) 
from directly or indirectly causing the Company to violate any of its exclusive 
contracts with territorial owners or to compete with territorial owners in 
violation of such contracts', and (3) from acting as the Company president and 
otherwise as a spokesperson for the company. The Court also enjoins and 
directs Stewart immediately to fill, complete and ship all pending orders for 
products received from Territorial Owners where such Territorial Owners 
have complied with the terms of the exclusive contracts. 
Addendum A (emphasis supplied). Ms. Stewart was served with the TRO on January 11, 
2001. R. 92; R. 14317: \ 75. On January 16, 2001, the trial court modified the TRO by 
striking subpart (3) at Ms. Stewart's attorney's request, precisely so Ms. Stewart would have 
corporate authority to immediately fill pending orders so she would not be found in contempt. 
R. 14224:7, 18.47 
46As late as April 4, 2002, Apogee Essence, through a distributor, sold Excel USA 
products that were manufactured at Excel USA's facility in Springville, Utah. As late as 
April 16, 2002, Apogee Essence, through a distributor, sold products bearing the Apogee 
logo. R. 14345: Exs. 577, 580. 
^Successfully arguing for the modification, Ms. Stewart's attorney explained: 
Having been stripped of her power as president in paragraph 3 and then turn 
around and be told to take actions, essentially, and the only power she has as 
company president is we believe internally inconsistent and again exposes her to 
contempt sanctions . . . 
R. 14224: 7 (emphasis supplied). 
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2. INTERIM ORDER. 
Ms. Stewart stipulated to the principal relief sought by Dr. Chen. The trial court 
entered the Interim Order on February 21, 2001. Addendum B. Among other things, the 
Interim Order provided: 
12. Jau Hwa Stewart shall not tortiously interfere directly or indirectly with 
any contract determined by the Court at any time to exist between the 
Company and any distributor or any third party. 
13. Jau Hwa Stewart will immediately return to the Company's head-quarters 
any corporate assets in her custody or control including but not limited to all 
corporate records. . . 
Id. (emphasis supplied). The Interim Order also reinstated the board of directors as it existed 
prior to September 1,2000, which meant Ms. Stewart remained as a director-and fiduciary-
of Excel USA without interruption. Id. 
D. MS. STEWART'S CONTUMACIOUS CONDUCT. 
1. VIOLATIONS OF THE TRO. 
a. REFUSAL TO FILL ORDERS. 
While the TRO was in effect (January 10, 2001 to February 21, 2001), Ms. Stewart 
was represented by and consulted with counsel from at least two separate law firms, Kirton 
& McConkie and Stoel Rives. Despite this, Ms. Stewart ignored her duty to comply with the 
TRO. She claims she did not tell anyone at Excel USA about TRO or show anyone at Excel 
USAtheTRO. R. 14341:Ex.201. R. 14245: 102-03. Ms. Stewart did not at any time take 
action to comply with the TRO.48 
48Ms. Stewart specifically did not (1) provide or show certain employees a copy of 
the TRO, R. 14341: Ex. 201, (2) inform employees there was a TRO in place that must be 
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b. TERMINATION OF HONG KING DISTRIBUTOR. 
On January 18,2001, Taig Stewart, at his wife's direction, signed a letter purportedly 
terminating Excel USA's exclusive distributorship agreement with Extra Excel International 
(HK) Limited ("Excel Hong Kong"). R. 14341: Ex. 206. At the time he signed the 
termination notice, R. 14341: Exhibit 206, he was aware the trial court had entered a TRO, 
which enjoined Ms. Stewart from "directly or indirectly causing the Company to violate any 
of its exclusive contracts with territorial owners . . ." Addendum A; R. 14245: 73-74; R. 
14255: 73-78, 132-33. 
2. VIOLATION OF THE INTERIM ORDER. 
a. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTS. 
Ms. Stewart violated the Interim Order by tortiously interfering with the existing 
contracts between Excel USA and the Territorial Owners; she orchestrated the theft of 
property, including intellectual property, and used Excel USA's property to establish a 
competing enterprise; she orchestrated the theft of Excel USA products to be used by Rogue 
Distributors to undermine the Territorial Owners' existing markets and to damage Excel 
USA's and the Territorial Owners' good will; she orchestrated the theft of property 
followed, (3) inform employees that Excel USA had certain duties imposed by the court 
with respect to filling orders; (4) rescind her instructions precluding the shipment of 
products to the Territorial Owners in Taiwan and Malaysia, (5) instruct any employee or 
agent of Excel USA to cause products that were en route to the Rogue Distributors to be 
returned to the company or to be re-routed in order to comply with the TRO, or (6) 
instruct employees or anyone else to fill confirmed orders from the Territorial Owners in 
Taiwan and Malaysia. Ms. Barclay admitted that despite the lawsuit, she continued to 
follow Ms. Stewart's instructions, including the directive not to ship product to the 
Territorial Owners in Malaysia and Taiwan. R. 14244: 57-59, 106-07; R. 14245: 7-15, 
63-67,76-78, 102-03; R. 14252: 172-74, 181-82. 
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belonging to Excel USA, depriving it of the ability to use such property in its operation or 
to obtain needed cash flow; she recruited employees and former employees of Excel USA 
in violation of non-competition contracts; she utilized Excel USA resources, including 
employer and proprietary information, and breached her fiduciary duties in the establishment 
of Apogee; and, she recruited Territorial Owners' managers, Messrs. Hu and Tzu, Rogue 
Distributors, to compete with and undermine the Territorial Owners' markets. 
b. REFUSAL TO RETURN EXCEL US A'S PROPERTY. 
Only after substantial harm had accrued to Excel USA, some of the property was 
returned. On October 11, 2001, two weeks before the OSC Hearings began, Taig Stewart 
returned certain of the items he had removed in February 2001, as listed in Addendum F. 
These items had been in Ms. Stewart's custody and control. R. 14255: 117-18, 134; R. 
14262: 12-17. Shortly before October 11, 2001, Mr. Hymas returned the two Epson 9000 
printers. In transporting the printers, Mr. Hymas caused them to incur substantial damage. 
R. 14255: 134-35; R. 14262: 29-31, 40-41, 45-46. In an Affidavit dated May 9, 2002, Ms. 
Stewart testified as follows: 
I, Jau-Hwa Stewart, asked Brian Hymas to deliver the two Epson 9000 printers to E. 
Excel in his truck... I believe Mr. Hymas did as I asked of him with reasonable care. 
However, as Mr. Hymas was doing me a favor under my direction, I accept full 
responsibility for any damages that may have occurred to the printers while they were 
being delivered. 
R. 14345: Ex. 578. 
The list of documents and things not returned to Excel USA in violation of the Interim 
Order is material and extensive. See R. 14302: 6-12; R. 14256: 95-100. Compare 
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Addendum E (Affidavits and Exhibits listing missing property), with Addendum F (list of 
property Taig Stewart returned, including condition of certain property). 
E. OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE AND PERJURY, 
In latter January 2001, Ms. Stewart, Mr. Hu and Mr. Tzu convened a conference 
telephone call. The Conversation occurred while Mr. Hu was in Taiwan and while Ms. 
Stewart and Mr. Tzu were in Ms. Stewart's office at Excel USA in Springville, Utah. R. 
14232: 53-55. This trio agreed concerning how they would testify in the ongoing First 
Preliminary Injunction Hearing. (None of the three at the time of the Conversation had yet 
testified.) They each agreed they would testify falsely concerning numerous material 
matters. R. 14342: Ex. 277 (Addendum K). It was also agreed that if asked questions they 
did not wish to answer or which if answered would expose aspects of the scheme, the three 
would simply say they could not remember or make other statements to avoid answering 
truthfully. Id. 
Following the Conversation but prior to counsel for Dr. Chen learning about it, Ms. 
Stewart gave testimony in the proceedings on February 8, 2001. Her testimony was faithful 
to her agreement with Messrs. Hu and Tzu but unfaithful to her duty to testify truthfully. 
Here is part of what she said under oath: 
Q. Have you either through Excel International or otherwise supplied money or 
caused money to be supplied to Richard Hu or through Richard Hu for the 
purpose of establishing a sales network in the Philippines? 
A. I don't believe that I have. 
Q. I don't believe that--you said, "I don't' believe I have"? 
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A. I don't recall-
ed. Do you know if-
A. —that I have. 
Q. You don't recall that? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know if Richard Hu has received money through association with your 
family for the purpose of setting up a sales distribution network in the 
Philippines? 
A. I don't know. . . . 
Q. Okay. Now could you tell me where your aunt has wired money from this 
account? 
A. Where my aunt lias-
es. Yes. You mentioned that these wires came to you. You're responsible to see 
that Michelle does what is requested. Where has your aunt wired money? 
A. I don't keep record of that. 
Q. You can't remember anything about where money has been wired from your 
aunt's account? 
A. They might have wired some back to their son—um—I don't usually turn 
around and send the fax, so I really do not—I really do not pay attention to their 
wires. . . . 
Q. . . . Have you knowledge of any money being wired from Central Bank from 
your aunt's account for the benefit of Richard Hu or through Richard Hu? 
A. We might have. I am not sure. 
Q. And if you might have, when might that have been? 
A. I do not know. I don't recall. 
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Q. Would it have been since September first of last year? 
A. Yes. It would have been after. 
Q. And could you tell me what you know about the purpose for wiring money 
from your aunt's account to Richard Hu? 
A. I do not know. . . . 
Q. Have you told me about all of the wires, transfers of money from your aunt's 
account that you can remember knowing about? 
A. At this time, yes. . . . 
Q. And could you tell me where money has been wired from your uncle's 
account? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. And do you recall whether any money was wired to Richard Hu from your 
uncle's account? 
A. I don't remember. . . . 
R. 14293: 108-09, 113-14, 116-17, 119-20, 145. 
A tape recording of the Conversation was delivered anonymously to Dr. Chen's 
residence in Singapore. R. 14232: 84-85. Dr. Chen's counsel received the recording on 
February 12, 2001. R. 14232: 83-87. Messrs. Hu and Tzu were scheduled to testify in the 
First Preliminary Injunction Hearing on February 13, 2001. R. 14232. Based upon the 
content of the tape, Dr. Chen and her counsel discovered that Ms. Stewart and her witnesses 
likely had commenced carrying out and would likely continue to carry out a plan to obstruct 
justice. R. 14232: 55-58. See also R. 14232: 39-70; Addendum K.49 
49The Conversation was in Mandarin Chinese. Addendum K consists of the 
translation of the Conversation presented by the expert witness for Dr. Chen, Ex. 276 
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On February 13, 2001, Mr. Hu was called as the first witness for Ms. Stewart (and 
purportedly Excel USA) in the First Preliminary Injunction Hearing. Mr. Hu's testimony 
adhered to the conspiratorial agreement he, Ms. Stewart and Mr. Tzu had reached to testify 
falsify. After acknowledging he was under oath, was obliged to tell the truth and that there 
could be adverse consequences if he did not tell the truth, Mr. Hu testified on cross 
examination as follows^0: (1) he falsely denied he had a current business relationship with 
Ms. Stewart; R. 14232: 39; (2) he falsely denied he had any association with Excellent 
Essentials International Corp., id. at 39; (3) he falsely denied knowing whether Paris Uy had 
any association with Excellent Essentials International Corp., id. at 39-40; (4) he admitted 
having loaned money to Mr. Uy, but falsely denied knowing the purpose of the loan, id. at 
40; (5) he falsely claimed he had borrowed the money from "Mother Chen," and falsely 
claimed that Ms. Stewart had played no part in his securing the loan from her mother, id. at 
40-42; (6) he falsely denied ever having discussed with Ms. Stewart and Mr. Tzu what he 
would say if he were asked if he had obtained funds from Ms. Stewart and Mother Chen to 
give to Mr. Uy, id. at 42; (7) he falsely denied having had a conversation with Ms. Stewart 
concerning whether people would find out that Ms. Stewart had arranged money for him for 
use in the new company, id. at 43; (8) he falsely denied that Ms. Stewart had told him the 
money he received to put into a new company was coming from Ms. Stewart's aunt, id. at 
(Addendum I), and the translation presented by the expert witness for Ms. Stewart. Ex. 
504 (Addendum J). The translations were presented in a side-by-side format in Exhibit 
277 so the respective translations could be compared. 
50Each of Mr. Hu's lies under oath was contradicted by the Conversation. 
Addendum K. 
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43; (9) he falsely denied that Mr. Uy was fronting for him, and denied that the new company 
was really his, id. at 43-44; (10) he falsely denied having discussed and agreed with Ms. 
Stewart and Mr. Tzu that if they were asked about the wired money, he would simply say the 
money was loaned between friends from Mr. Hu to Mr. Uy for unknown purposes, id. at 44-
45; (11) he falsely denied having discussed with Ms. Stewart and Mr. Tzu what testimony 
he would offer if he were called as a witness in this proceeding, id. at 44-45; (12) he falsely 
denied having discussed with Ms. Stewart and Mr. Tzu what was said in meetings at the 
Provo Marriott Hotel on October 19,2000, between Mr. Tjandra and Dr. Chen, id. at 47-48; 
and (13) he falsely denied having discussed with Ms. Stewart and Mr. Tzu whether someone 
should go to jail, id. at 48-49; Addendum K. 
Dr. Chen's counsel presented Mr. Hu with a translation of the Conversation, proposed 
Exhibit 103,51 to "refresh [his] recollection about a conversation that was held [among Mr. 
Hu], Jau-Hwa Stewart... and Sam Tsue [sic] on or about January 23rd of [2001 ]." R. 14232: 
52. The court sustained an objection to use of the document for that purpose. Id. To lay 
foundation for the admission of Exhibit 103, Dr. Chen's counsel showed Exhibit 103 to Mr. 
Hu and asked whether he had had the Conversation with Ms. Stewart and Mr. Tzu in latter 
January 2001 where they discussed the items reflected in Exhibit 103. Mr. Hu said he did 
not remember. Id. He was asked the question again. After looking at Exhibit 103, he 
answered, through the interpreter, "I don't remember that I talked so much." Id. Counsel 
asked him again whether he remembered the Conversation, and he answered affirmatively: 
51Proposed Exhibit 103 has not been admitted into evidence. 
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"I have a telephone conversation with Jau-Hwa." Id. at 53-54. He denied recalling whether 
Mr. Tzu had participated in the Conversation, so counsel played a brief portion of the tape 
recording. Id. at 52-53. Mr. Hu in response identified the voices of Ms. Stewart, Mr. Tzu 
and himself on the tape recording and admitted the three of them had had a telephone 
conference. Id. at 53-54. At this point, at the request of counsel for Dr. Chen, the court 
instructed Mr. Hu concerning his constitutional rights. Id. at 54-62. The court then 
appointed a criminal defense attorney from the Legal Defenders Association to assist Mr. Hu 
in connection with his remaining testimony. Id. at 62. 
Cross examination resumed after a recess. Mr. Hu admitted having reviewed the first 
two pages of Exhibit 103, but on Fifth Amendment grounds declined to answer whether it 
accurately set forth the Conversation. Id. at 69. He admitted having been placed under oath 
and swearing to tell the truth in the proceeding then ongoing, but on Fifth Amendment 
grounds declined to answer whether he had testified truthfully. Id. at 69-70. Mr. Hu then 
stated he would continue to decline to answer further questions put by counsel for Dr. Chen 
concerning the Conversation on Fifth Amendment grounds, so without the opportunity to 
conduct a complete and thorough examination of Mr. Hu in connection with the 
Conversation, Dr. Chen's counsel passed the witness. Id. at 67.52 
52Even though Mr. Hu refused to answer any further questions put to him by Dr. 
Chen's counsel, Mr. Hu answered some foundational questions put to him by Ms. 
Stewart's and Excel USA's counsel. He admitted he was in Taiwan when the 
Conversation took place, id. at 72; he admitted he was at his home in Taipei when the 
Conversation took place, id. at 73; he did not recall what time of day it was when the 
Conversation took place, id. at 72; and he could not recall who had placed the call to 
initiate the Conversation. Id. at 73. When asked whether Dr. Chen had the ability to tape 
record the Conversation, his response, over objection, was, "In Asia maybe." Id. at 71. 
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Counsel for Ms. Stewart and Excel USA objected to admission of the Conversation 
on foundational grounds and on the wholly unsupported assertion that the recording might 
have been obtained in violation of state or federal law. Id. at 74. Dr. Chen's counsel 
proposed that the tape of the Conversation be played so counsel could ask Mr. Hu whether 
the it accurately reflected the Conversation. Id. at 76. Mr. Hu's counsel said she would 
advise him not to answer such question, even though Mr. Hu had already testified he would 
answer no further questions from Dr. Chen's counsel on the subject. Id. at 77. Therefore, 
Dr. Chen was prevented from making further inquiry into the content of the tape 
recording-although Mr. Hu had already authenticated the Conversation. The court 
responded as follows: 
For the record, I would expect that I would allow you to play the tape, that question 
would be posed and that would be your advice as counsel. He then would not answer 
the question. And then I think it raises the dilemma... of whether or not the plaintiff 
should be prohibited from foundation on a tape for a civil proceeding based on a 
defense for a criminal-suggested criminal proceeding, and I don't think that should 
be the case. 
So given what I've heard to date, I would probably receive the tape . . . I'm not going 
to require you to play it and pose the question . . . Absent this kind of refusal to 
answer the question, his answer would probably be, "Yeah." He would-you would 
be able to lay the foundation for the civil case . . . . 
Id. at 77-78.53 
53Dr. Chen, who traveled from Singapore and testified earlier in February 2001, re-
took the witness stand to dispel any assertion that she had been involved in recording or 
obtaining the recording of the conversation. Her testimony was that she recognized the 
voices on the tape as those of Ms. Stewart, Mr. Hu and Mr. Tzu. R. 14232: 82. On the 
prior Thursday evening (after Ms. Stewart had perjured herself), February 8, 2001, she 
learned from her husband by telephone that the recording had been delivered by mail 
anonymously to their home in Singapore, and she had made arrangements with her 
husband to express ship it to the United States. Id. at 83. She knew nothing about the 
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F. DENIAL OF MS. STEWART'S MOTION TO STRIKE. 
On February 19, 2001, Ms. Stewart filed a Motion to Strike, objecting to Dr. Chen's 
proposed admission of the Conversation into evidence, to suppress use of the Conversation 
in future hearings, and for sanctions against Dr. Chen and her counsel for using the tape.54 
R. 604-620. In opposing the Motion, counsel for Dr. Chen explained: 
The receipt of information indicating that a party and identified witnesses . . . had 
conspired . . . to obstruct justice imposed upon plaintiffs counsel a great burden and 
professional obligation... to determine whether it was proper for counsel to disclose 
the existence of the conspiracy... or whether,... plaintiffs counsel was required to 
stand silent and allow the conspirators to defraud the Court.. . . 
Prior to disclosing the existence of the tape recording at the hearing in this case, 
plaintiffs counsel was required to consider (1) the existence of an obvious conspiracy 
to defraud the Court; (2) counsel's responsibilities as officers of the Court to disclose, 
and not to conceal, material having evidentiary value in the administration of justice; 
and (3) applicable law, . . . with respect to the recording, disclosing, and using 
recorded telephone conversations . . . [P]laintiff s counsel conducted their own due 
diligence, and concluded the law to be as follows: 
1. If a telephone conversation is recorded by a participant or by someone 
authorized by a participant, the recording is not a violation of Federal or Utah 
law and is not subject to the Acts' exclusionary rules . . . . 
2. To determine whether a conversation has been lawfully recorded, it is 
the point of interception that governs. . . . 
3. There is no presumption of illegality. . . . [T]he party claiming the 
recording was obtained in violation of the Acts has the burden of proof. 
circumstances of the tape being made. Id. at 83. Her husband express shipped it directly 
to her lawyers and it arrived February 12, 2001. Id. at 83. 
54Ms. Stewart submitted the Affidavit of Mr. Hu wherein he boldly asserted from 
half a world away (Taiwan) not to know the origin of the recording. The trial court struck 
Mr. Hu's Affidavit because he had previously invoked the Fifth Amendment. 
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4. [For] . . . use . . .to be a violation . . ., the user must know or have 
reason to know the recording was obtained in violation of the law. 
R. 698-700. (emphasis in original). 
The court heard argument on the Motion to Strike on March 26,2001. Ms. Stewart's 
counsel then admitted, "We do not know where the interception took place"55 R. 14236: 
10 (emphasis supplied). Her counsel argued the Motion should be granted and the 
Conversation wholly disregarded because "[t]his Court does not know [where the 
conversation was recorded], so the Court is going to have to make a judgment call. It needs 
to err on the side of the integrity and honesty of the proceedings" (asking the court to 
presume illegality). Id. The court denied the Motion, R. 14236: 68, and the Order was 
signed July 5, 2001, admitting Exhibit 104 into evidence. R. 2148, 2153. 
The trial court also struck the Affidavit Mr. Hu had submitted supporting the Motion, 
as follows: 
Mr. Hu cannot now submit an affidavit,.. . which purports to discuss matters as to 
which he invoked his right against self-incrimination. The negative inferences the 
Court has drawn and may draw concerning what Mr. Hu's answers would have been 
. . . cannot now be overcome by the after-the-fact submission of an affidavit that is not 
subject to cross-examination... [Exhibit 104fs] disclosure and use for the purpose of 
impeaching the testimony of Mr. Hu was proper. R. 2148-9. 
G. THE CONTEMPT MOTIONS, 
The Conversation was brought before the court in the Hong Kong Case. In two of the 
55The recording most likely occurred in Asia. The tape was delivered via mail to 
an address in Southeast Asia. The Court is encouraged to listen to the tape because when 
the single male speaks (Mr. Hu, who was in Taiwan), as compared to the female and male 
on the other end (Ms. Stewart and Mr. Tzu, who were in Utah), the voice does not sound 
as though it is through a telephone and children can be heard in the background. When 
the others speak, they sound as though they are on a telephone. 
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Affirmations Ms. Stewart filed in that case, she authenticated the Conversation and 
apologized to that court for attempting to "mislead the Utah court." In an Affirmation, dated 
July 24, 2001, she states: 
I wish to deal briefly with the tape recording of my conversation with Mr. Hu and Mr. 
Tzu, leaving aside the question of how such a recording was obtained by the 
Defendants. First of all, I regret very much attempling to mislead the Utah court. At 
the time, I was so angry with my sister . . . . As can be seen from the emails which I 
have exhibited, the relationship between [Dr. ChenJ and I was very good and we [got] 
along with each other very well. . . . 
I apoligise [sic] for my conduct, which in hindsight was very foolish, and I sincerely 
ask that the Court not regard me as a dishonest or malicious person, which I am not, 
as the people who know me well will testify at trial. 
Addendum G, ^  44-45. Ms. Stewart made a virtually identical statement in her Affirmation 
dated August 1, 2001. Addendum H, fflf 126-127.56 She later testified that her Affirmations 
in the Hong Kong Case were true, and that she would not have signed a document containing 
untruthful statements. Ex. 263 (deposition), at 223-26.57 
56Addendum G and Addendum H would later be admitted as evidence in the 
Contempt Proceedings without objection. R. 14250: 15 I; R. 14250: 39-40. 
57Exhibit 263 was admitted without objection in the OSC Hearings. Contrary to 
Ms. Stewart's February 8, 2001 testimony during the First Preliminary Injunction 
Hearing, on August 1, 2001, Ms. Stewart signed her Fourth Affirmation in the Hong 
Kong Case, Addendum H, wherein she stated: 
(7) It was [December 23, 2000] that I realized that the Corporation effectively 
had no control over or interest in any of the Distributors of its products. As 
such, I decided that the Corporation should have its own distribution 
channels so as to ensure that its network of distributors would be loyal to 
the interests of the Corporation . . . . I therefore established on behalf of the 
Corporation new Hong Kong and Philippines distributors ("New 
Distributors"). As mentioned . . . above, Ihe Corporation is the 80% 
shareholder of the New Distributor in Hong Kong. 
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The first Contempt Motion, dated June 22, 2001, referenced Ms. Stewart's multiple 
violations of the TRO and the Interim Order. The second Contempt Motion, dated July 31, 
2001, dealt with the evidence established in part by the Conversation and Ms. Stewart's 
admissions that she had attempted to mislead the Utah court. R. 14305-14307. 
In Ms. Stewart's Memorandum in Opposition to the Second Contempt Motion, dated 
August 10, 2001, Ms. Stewart made no claim that (1) Exhibit 104 was improperly admitted 
as impeachment evidence against Mr. Hu, or (2) Exhibit 104 could not or should not be 
considered as evidence of Ms. Stewart's obstruction of justice in the OSC Hearings. R. 2280-
2285. This was filed after she had authenticated the tape in her Third and Fourth 
Affirmations, and had apologized for having attempted to mislead the Utah court. 
Addendum G, fflj 44-45; Addendum H, fflj 126-127. In Ms. Stewart's referenced 
Memorandum, she made essentially the same concessions. R. 2282. 
The OSC Hearings began October 25,2001, R. 14244, and concluded June 26,2002. 
R. 14276. During the OSC Hearings, Ms. Stewart contradicted her testimony of February 
8, 2001, but persisted in attempting to mislead the trial court. Ms. Stewart's sworn 
testimony, both before and after the existence of the Conversation was found out, shows 
disdain for the judicial process and disregard to the fundamental duty of a witness to speak 
truthfully. See Addendum N (R. 14250: 21-26, 34-35); Addendum K. 
After the Contempt Motions were filed, Ms. Stewart had every incentive and 
Upon later examination in this proceeding, Ms. Stewart claimed, in essence, she had 
forgotten to complete the necessary paperwork, leaving Excel USA with no ownership of, 
and no control over, the entities that had received millions of dollars in cash and product 
from Ms. Stewart. R. 14245: 44-45. 
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opportunity to retain an expert to evaluate whether the tape recording had been altered or 
tampered with in any way. No such witness testified in Ms. Stewart's behalf. Neither did 
Ms. Stewart produce evidence that the tape recording had been obtained in violation of state 
or federal law. At no time during the evidentiary portion of the OSC Hearings did Ms. 
Stewart or any other witness assert that the tape recording was (i) inaccurate in any respect, 
(ii) incomplete, (iii) had been altered or tampered with, or (iv) that the chain of custody was 
in some way flawed. Her conduct during the OSC Hearings was entirely consistent with the 
fact that Exhibit 104 was an accurate and complete recording of the Conversation. Ms. 
Stewart affirmatively used the contents of the Conversation in her defense to the Contempt 
Motions. She did so by submitting her own expert's translation of the Conversation. R. 
14344: Ex. 504 (Addendum J). Not only did Ms. Stewart submit her own expert's 
translation, she submitted his expert testimony concerning why the court should determine 
his translation was more accurate than the translation submitted by Dr. Chen's expert.58 Ms. 
Stewart did not object to the admission of Dr. Chen's translation. R. 14254: 32-33; R. 
14342: Ex. 276 (Addendum I). The court admitted Addendum J over objection. R. 14286: 
38, 42. 
At no time before or during the OSC Hearing did Ms. Stewart demand a jury in 
writing or otherwise. 
After many days of evidence and argument, on August 20, 2002, the trial court 
58The trial court found the translations were not materially different. R. 14286: 41-
42. See Addendum K. 
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entered the Stewart Contempt Orders, striking her pleadings as a remedy. R. 14317. 
VIII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Ms. Stewart attempted to undermine the administration of justice through a scheme 
to obstruct justice and defraud the trial court. Evidence of her scheme is embodied in the 
Conversation, which was properly admitted and considered to impeach Mr. Hu, and as 
substantive evidence of Ms. Stewart's contempt. Ms. Stewart failed to overcome the 
presumption of admissibility afforded by the Rules of Evidence. She waived her claim that 
the Conversation was obtained and used in violation of state and federal law, and she cannot 
now, for the first time on appeal, assert a claim with respect to the use of the Conversation 
as substantive evidence of her contumacious behavior in light of her admissions against 
interest and her own affirmative use of the Conversation. Ms. Stewart also willfully and 
intentionally violated two Orders. 
The trial court properly struck her pleadings as a sanction for her pervasive contempt. 
The trial court had the power and the authority to do so, and acted properly within its 
discretion by striking her pleadings because her contumacious conduct undermined the 
integrity of the very same proceeding, causing great harm to other litigants. Ms. Stewart 
cannot successfully raise, for the first time on appeal, an argument that the court did not have 
authority to levy such a sanction in response to her willful disregard for the trial court's 
authority, its Orders, and her disregard for the integrity of the judiciary. 
Finally, Ms. Stewart was accorded due process. She was not entitled to a jury trial on 
59The court awarded Dr. Chen attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, 
and not as a contempt sanction. R. 14317. 
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the contempt issues because she did not request one in writing as mandated by applicable 
rules. The evidence, independent of Mr. Holman's involvement, fully supports the Stewart 
Contempt Orders. 
IX. ARGUMENT: 
THE CONTEMPT ORDERS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
A. EXHIBIT 104 WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED AND USED. 
Ms. Stewart admits the Conversation occurred. Even viewing the Conversation in the 
light most favorable to her (i.e., accepting the translation she submitted into evidence, 
Addendum J), in her words she admitted trying "to mislead the Utah court." The 
Conversation clearly demonstrates Ms. Stewart's perpetration of a scheme to defraud the 
court through obstructing justice. The testimony of witness Hu and of Ms. Stewart reveals 
without question that they sought to carry out this plan. 
1. MS. STEWART FAILED TO OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF 
ADMISSIBILITY. 
The Rules of Evidence favor the admission of relevant evidence, and presume its 
admissibility. United States v. Sowards, 370 F.2d 87, 90 (10th Cir. 1966); State v. Bluff, 
2002 UT 66, Tf 45, 52 P.3d 1210, 1225 (referencing "general presumption of admissibility 
favored by the Rules of Evidence"). Defendant's argument that Exhibit 104 was improperly 
admitted into evidence wrongly assumes, with no evidentiary support whatsoever, (1) that 
the recording was obtained in violation of Utah's Interception of Communications Act 
("Utah Act") or its Federal counterpart, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
("Federal Act") (or collectively the "Acts"); and (2) that Dr. Chen or her counsel knew or 
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had reason to know it had been obtained and was being used in violation of the Acts, thereby 
invoking the Acts' exclusionary provisions. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-4(l)(b) (i-iv), 18 
U.S.C. § 2511(l)(c) & (d) & (2)(d).60 
It was and is Ms. Stewart's burden to overcome the presumption of admissibility 
establishing the Conversation was obtained in violation of one or both Acts. In considering 
this, it is important to note: (1) no violation of the Acts occurs when a participant records or 
authorizes the recording, and (2) interception outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States is not a violation of the Acts.61 During the proceedings, Ms. Stewart's attorney 
conceded it is unknown how or where the recording of the Conversation was obtained. Ms. 
Stewart also conceded this at various points in her Brief.62 Stewarts' Brief, at 5 ("potentially 
60The Federal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2515, and the Utah Act, Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-
7, both provide that whenever a wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part 
of the contents may be received in evidence in any trial if the "disclosure of that 
information would be in violation of this chapter." The apparent purpose for the extreme 
remedies of suppression under exclusionary rules is to defer privacy-invading misconduct 
by denying wrongdoers the fruits of their misconduct, but exclusion is authorized only 
when interception of wire or oral communications was unlawful. 
61The party objecting to the use of the recording has the burden to establish that the 
interception was obtained in violation of the Acts. United States v. Ross, 713 F.2d 389, 
391 (8th Cir. 1983); State v. Childs, 728 N.E.2d 379, 391 (Ohio 2000); United States v. 
Ruppel, 666 F.2d 261, 271(5th Cir. 1982), cert, denied, 458 U.S. 1107 (1982). Cf. State v. 
Atwood, 831 P.2d 1056, 1058 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (proponent of motion to suppress 
has burden of establishing his Fourth Amendment rights were violated; "[ejvidence 
sought to be excluded is admissible . . . until the accused has established that his rights . . 
. have been invaded"); State v. Peterson, 841 P.2d 21 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (defendant 
failed to establish in suppression motion that interception did not comply with wiretap 
order). Where the objecting party fails to meet that burden, the Acts' exclusionary rules 
cannot serve as the basis for excluding the evidence. State v. Johnson-Howell, 881 P.2d 
1288, 1301 (Kan. 1994). 
62Utah appellate courts have not addressed many of the issues herein. Federal law 
and the law of other states interpreting similar provisions is instructive. 
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illegally obtained audiotape") (emphasis supplied), 18. 
The burden is two-fold. First, the person seeking exclusion of the evidence must 
prove the communication was obtained in violation of the Acts. Second, that person must 
prove that the person using the communication knew or had reason to know it was obtained 
in violation of the Acts. There is no presumption of illegality. Rather, the presumption 
under the Rules of Evidence is one of admissibility. In Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F. Supp. 
1535,1541-42 (D. Utah 1993), a civil action brought for the alleged violation of the Federal 
Act, the court explained: 
[I]n order for a plaintiff to prevail on a use or disclosure claim, the plaintiff 
must prove: (1) that the defendant 'knew or should have known5 that the 
information was the product of an illegal wiretap, and (2) that the defendant 
had knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the interception so 
that he 'knew or should have known' that the interception was prohibited 
under Title III. 
. . . . Mere knowledge that the information allegedly used or disclosed came 
from a wiretap is insufficient unless additional circumstantial proof is 
introduced the would enable the inference to be drawn that the defendant knew 
or should have known that the wiretap was an illegal one under Title III. 
a. NO VIOLATION OCCURS WHEN A PARTICIPANT 
RECORDS OR AUTHORIZES THE RECORDING. 
The Utah and Federal Wiretap Acts are meant to protect privacy. Participants to 
conversations have no expectation of privacy vis-a-vis other participants. Utah's Interception 
of Communications Act provides: 
(7) (b) A person not acting under color of law may intercept a wire, electronic, or oral 
communication if that person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to 
63
"[T]here is no evidence in the over 20,000 pages of record that identifies who 
taped the conversation, where the conversation was taped . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) 
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the communication has given prior consent to the interception, unless the 
communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious 
act in violation of state or federal law. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-4(7)(b) (emphasis supplied). 
The Federal Act is similar: 
(2)(d) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color 
of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a 
party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has 
given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for 
the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution 
or laws of the United States or of any State. 
18 U.S.C. § 251 l(2)(d) (emphasis supplied). 
b. THERE IS NO VIOLATION WHEN INTERCEPTION 
OCCURS OUTSIDE THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES. 
Both Acts focus upon the point of "interception." Utah Code Ann § 77-23a-4; 18 
U.S.C. § 2511. If a conversation is intercepted outside the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States, the interception and use of a recording of such conversation does not violate 
the Acts even if the intercepted telephone conversation travels in part over this Country's 
communication system and even if the recording would have been a violation of the Acts if 
intercepted here. In United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1975), cert denied, 426 
U.S. 906 (1976), defendants were convicted based in part upon wiretaps obtained by 
Canadian police without judicial authorization. The intercepted communications were 
provided to authorities in the United States. Defendants' efforts to exclude the intercepted 
communications were unsuccessful. The court stated: 
The District Judge also held that, although the intercepted telephone 
conversation traveled in part over our country's communication system, their 
47 
introduction into evidence was not proscribed by Title III. . . . Thus, it is not 
the route followed by foreign communications which determines the 
application of Title III; it is where the interception took place. 
Id at 711.64 
c. MS. STEWART DID NOT MEET HER BURDEN. 
There were three parties to the Conversation. Two of the participants, Ms. Stewart 
and Mr. Tzu, were at Ms. Stewart's office in Springville, Utah, and the third, Mr. Hu, was 
at his home in Taiwan. Ms. Stewart claims she did not record or agree to the recording of 
the Conversation. Mr. Tzu and Mr. Hu could have given complete testimony on the subject, 
but neither did so while in the United States because they would have been subjected to 
cross-examination and would have further incriminated themselves.65 
64In United States v. Angulo-Hurtado, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1363 (N.D. Ga. 2001), the 
court held that Title III standards do not apply outside the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States. Id. at 1369 (stating the Federal Act evidences congressional intent to 
exclude from Title Ill's coverage foreign surveillance: "Congress intended Title III to 
protect the integrity of United States communications systems against unauthorized 
interceptions taking place in the United States") (emphasis supplied) (and quoting Sale v. 
Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) ("Acts of Congress normally do not 
have extraterritorial application unless such an intent is clearly manifested.")). See also 
United States v. Delaplane, 778 F.2d 570, 573 (10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 
827 (1986); United States v. Romano, 706 F.2d 370, 376 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. 
Tirinkian, 502 F. Supp. 620, 627 (D.N.D. 1980), off'd sub nom., United States v. Wentz, 
686 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1982); People v. Capolongo, 623 N.Y.S.2d 778 (N.Y. 1995) 
(interpreting New York's Privacy Act). 
65Ms. Stewart disputes the foundation for admission of Exhibit 104 (audiotape). 
Stewart's Brief, at 39-42. She urges for the first time on appeal that Utah courts adopt a 
multi-step test for establishing the foundational requirements for admission of audio-
tapes. The purpose served by foundation is, as conceded by Ms. Stewart, to authenticate 
or identify evidence. Here, the requirement of authentication and identification was more 
than adequately fulfilled by the admissions of Ms. Stewart and Mr. Hu as well as the 
adverse inferences drawn by the trial court. Both identified participants in the 
Conversation and admitted that the Conversation took place. R. 14232: 53-54; R. 14341: 
Ex. 228; 1f 126; R. 14343: Ex. 406; If 44. Dr. Chen also identified all three voices on the 
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Ms. Stewart admits it is unknown who recorded the Conversation, by what means it 
was recorded and where it was recorded. Ms. Stewart's counsel supported this admission by 
asking the court to presume it had been obtained illegally, ironically suggesting that the court 
do so to "err on the side of the integrity and honesty of the proceedings." R. 14236: 10. See 
also Stewarts' Brief, at 5,18. Mr. Hu authenticated the Conversation on February 13,2001.66 
The other conspirators, Ms. Stewart and Mr. Tzu, filed after-the-fact, self-serving Affidavits 
claiming they did not authorize the recording. Mr. Hu, the third conspirator, invoked the 
Fifth Amendment and refused to submit to proper examination concerning the Conversation 
as to which the trial court properly drew adverse inferences. In addition, the court had no 
reason to rely on the Affidavits.67 
Mr. Hu had ample reason to continue testifying falsely, including denying he had 
recorded the conversation or authorized its recording. He had been caught in multiple lies 
on the witness stand. Assuming Mr. Hu recorded the Conversation, it is likely he did not 
want Ms. Stewart or Mr. Tzu to know he had surreptitiously recorded the Conversation. And 
all three persons who submitted Affidavits of denial in an effort to prevent Exhibit 104's 
admission had strong motives to want Exhibit 104 not admitted into evidence-it was direct, 
unequivocal evidence of their conspiracy to obstruct justice, and suborn and commit perjury. 
tape. The other proposed requirements are either meaningless or were waived. 
66Ms. Stewart later authenticated the Conversation in her Third and Fourth 
Affirmations. Addendum H, fflf 126-127; Addendum G, ffl[ 44-45. 
67The myriad examples of demonstrable perjury and subornation of perjury in the 
record establish that the court understandably was not required to rely upon anything they 
said or wrote under oath as resembling the truth. 
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Ms. Stewart submitted no affirmative evidence whatsoever elucidating the circumstances of 
how and where the Conversation was acquired. 
The responsibility to meet the burden is explained in Peavy v. Dallas Independent 
SchoolDist., 57 F. Supp. 2d 382 (N.D. Tex. 1999), where a person anonymously delivered 
to District Trustees copies of an audio tape (the "Tape") of an intercepted conversation(s) 
between Peavy and another person. Id. at 386. District staff transcribed the Tape the same 
day, and that evening, the transcript was read into the record of a Board meeting. Kress, 
president of the Board, did not attempt to prevent the Trustees from reading the transcript 
into the record. Id. Peavy resigned a week later, then sued Kress and the District under the 
Federal Act. The court granted Kress' Motion for Summary Judgment, and explained: 
To prevail... Peavy must establish that the disclosure or use "was intentional, 
that the information... was obtained from an intercepted communication, and 
that the defendant knew or should have known that the interception was 
illegal." . . . Peavy must not only establish that Kress knew he was disclosing 
or using information from an intercepted communication but also that Kress 
knew that neither party to the intercepted conversation had consented to its 
interception thereby making it illegal. 
. . . The court has pored over the entire summary judgment record and finds 
that the record is totally devoid of any competent evidence that Kress knew or 
should have known that the Tape was the result of an illegal interception, or 
that Kress knew that neither party to the intercepted conversation had 
consented to its interception.... [NJothing in the record indicates that Peavy 
himself knew that the Tape was illegally obtained, . . . 
[A] reasonable person would not have known or had reason to know the manner in 
which the Tape was received established that neither party to the conversation 
consented to its recording. . . . In the real world, recordings of confidential secret, 
or private conversations frequently are made by one party without the other party's 
knowledge and consent, and such a recording is perfectly permissible insofar as the 
Act and laws of the State of Texas are concerned. . . . 
Plaintiff confuses "private," "secret" and "confidential" with "illegal." . . . At 
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best, Plaintiff has a subjective belief, suspicion, or assumption that Kress knew 
or should have known that the tape was obtained illegally in violation of the 
Act. Such belief, opinion, suspicion, or assumption, without specific 
competent summary judgment evidence, is too slender a reed for a reasonable 
jury to make a finding of liability against Kress. . . . 
Id. at 388-89 (emphasis supplied and in original) (quoting Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 
1538 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994)).68 Here, even more compelling than in 
Peavy, Ms. Stewart has established neither illegality nor that Dr. Chen had any reason to 
believe the recording was obtained illegally.69 
Plaintiffs counsel found themselves in the unenviable position of having received 
information concerning an apparent and ongoing conspiracy to obstruct justice in the very 
court proceeding in which they were participating.70 Defense counsel found themselves in 
the unenviable position of seeking to suppress evidence that irrefutably established a 
conspiracy to defraud the court in the immediate proceeding. Against the backdrop of these 
b%See also United States v. Nietupski, 731 F. Supp. 881 (CD. 111. 1990) 
(surreptitious tape recordings of illegal drug activities which were made by coconspirator 
in furtherance of conspiracy did not have to be suppressed under Federal Act), aff'd, 33 
F.3d 1454 (7th Cir. 1994), cert, denied, 515 U.S. 1126 (1995). 
69This Court has not addressed whether an impeachment exception exists to one or 
both Acts. Cf. United States v. Echavarria-Olarte, 904 F.2d 1391, 1397 (9th Cir. 1990); 
United States v. Wuliger, 981 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1992); Frio v. Superior Court, 250 Cal. 
Rptr. 819, 828 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) ("The repugnance of an opportunity for a witness 
who was recorded to lie in this situation is akin to the circumstance of a criminal 
defendant who testifies at variance with an earlier statement ruled inadmissible because of 
a violation of Miranda''). 
70Counsel has been unable to locate any reported decision where the subject matter 
of the intercepted communication revealed a conspiracy to undermine the integrity of the 
very court proceeding then underway. The Rules of Professional Conduct give some 
guidance, but mostly in very general terms. The Rules do not and cannot contemplate 
every conceivable situation. See Utah Rules of Professional Conduct: Preamble: A 
Lawyer's Responsibilities; Scope; Rule 3.3; Rule 3.4. 
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circumstances, it is essential to note that candor toward the tribunal supersedes virtually 
every other duty a lawyer has, including one's duty to the client. As explained in United 
States v. Shaffer Equipment Co., 11 F.3d 450, 457-58 (4th Cir. 1993): 
[LJawyers, who serve as officers of the court, have the first line task of assuring the 
integrity of the process . . . The system can provide no harbor for clever devices to 
divert the search, mislead opposing counsel or the court, or cover up that which is 
necessary for justice in the end... [T]he lawyer's duties to maintain the confidences 
of a client and advocate vigorously are trumped ultimately by a duty to guard against 
the corruption that justice will be dispensed by an act of deceit. . . 
Neither [Rule 3.3 and 3.4] nor the entire Code of Professional Responsibility 
displaces the broader general duty of candor and good faith required to protect the 
integrity of the entire judicial process . . . 
The Supreme Court stated, "It is appropriate to remind counsel that they have a 
'continuing duty to inform the Court of any development which may conceivably 
affect the outcome' of the litigation." 
Id. at 457-58 (emphasis supplied and in original) (citation omitted). 
Neither plaintiff nor her counsel knew how and where the recording took place, and 
could not assume the recording was made in violation of the law. Plaintiffs counsel was on 
notice that it was possible Ms. Stewart and at least two of her witnesses were conspiring to 
perpetrate a fraud on the court, actively undermining the integrity of the judicial process. 
Given the attacks on the integrity of the court, use of the recording comported with counsels' 
duties as officers of the court and the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. 
2. EXHIBIT 104 WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED TO IMPEACH. 
Ms. Stewart called Mr. Hu as her first witness during the First Preliminary Injunction 
Hearing. He admitted he had had the Conversation with Ms. Stewart and Mr. Hu. He 
acknowledged he was at his home in Taiwan at the time of the Conversation. He invoked 
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the Fifth Amendment and refused to answer further questions posed by Dr. Chen's counsel. 
Ms. Stewart's counsel objected to admission of Exhibit 104 on foundational grounds. Dr. 
Chen's counsel proposed to play the entire tape so Mr. Hu could answer whether the 
recording was accurate. Mr. Hu's counsel said Mr. Hu would invoke the Fifth Amendment. 
The court concluded Dr. Chen should not be prevented from establishing foundation for 
Exhibit 104 by Mr. Hu's refusal and drew an adverse inference from Mr. Hu's invocation of 
the Fifth Amendment to the effect that if Mr. Hu answered the question, his answer would 
have confirmed the accuracy of the Conversation. R. 14232: 75-76. 
In civil cases, silence in the face of an accusation is a relevant fact that is not barred 
from consideration by the Fifth Amendment. See First Federal Savings & Loan Ass yn v. 
SchamaneK 684 P.2d 1257, 1267 (Utah 1984) (citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 
319(1976))71; Mid-America's Process Service and Lynn Whitefield v. Ellison, 767 F.2d 684 
(10th 1985) (parties may unquestionably assert this constitutional privilege in a civil case, 
but "may have to accept certain bad consequence which flow from that action"); SEC v. 
Wolfson, 2004 WL 985948, n.2 (D. Utah April 7, 2004). 
The policies supporting the Fifth Amendment apply with even less force when a non-
party witness testifies in a civil proceeding and thus, the Amendment will not work to 
preclude an adverse inference in this situation. See RAD Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & 
71
 Rosebud Sioux Tribe v.A&P Steel, 733 F.2d 509, 521 (8th Cir. 1984) ("the law 
of privileges tends to suppress truth. As a result, 'privileges must be strictly construed 
and accepted' only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify . . . has a 
public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational 
means for ascertaining the truth" (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 
(1980)). 
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Sur. Co., 808 F.2d 271,275 (3d Cir. 1986). A court may properly draw an adverse inference 
for the purpose of impeachment against a non-party witness who invokes the Fifth 
Amendment. United States v. Kaplan, 832 F.2d 676, 684 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that even 
in a criminal case, where non-party witness invokes the Fifth Amendment, the invocation 
"acts as a form of impeachment."). 
3. MS. STEWART WAIVED HER CLAIM THAT USE OF THE 
RECORDING WAS ILLEGAL. 
The recording was properly received into evidence. Use of the recording and the 
translations was also proper because Ms. Stewart made affirmative use of the Conversation. 
The court admitted Addendum J over objection, without limiting its evidentiary use. R. 
14286: 42. Ms. Stewart also offered, and the court admitted, Exhibit 503, a hand-written 
Chinese transcription provided to Dr. Chen's expert to assist him in his translation, once 
again without limiting its use. R. 14254: 59. When a party requests the court to admit 
relevant information and it is admitted, the party is bound to accept the consequences that 
follow, good or bad. See Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753 (2000).72 See also United 
72
"Generally, a party introducing evidence cannot complain on appeal that the 
evidence was erroneously admitted." Ohler, 529 U.S. at 755. See also United States v. 
Wagoner County Real Estate, 278 F.3d 1091, 1099 (10th Cir, 2002) ("As to the ruling on 
the admissibility of Mr. Lee's prior conviction under Rule 609, our conclusion is dictated 
by the holding of Ohler v. United States . . . . In Ohler, the trial court denied the 
defendant's in limine motion to preclude the government's use of a prior conviction for 
impeachment purposes. The defendant then testified on direct examination as to the prior 
conviction. The Court held that a party who 'preemptively introduces evidence of a prior 
conviction on direct examination may not on appeal claim that the admission of such 
evidence was error.'") (citation omitted). See also Pettifordv. Durrn, 175 F.3d 1020 (7th 
Cir. 1999) (unpublished opinion) (Addendum M) ("Introducing harmful evidence before 
it is elicited by the opposing party is sometimes considered a wise trial strategy, but its 
legal effect is to waive the issue of the admissibility of the evidence. . . . If a party wishes 
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States v. Ciocca, 106F.3d 1079, 1085 (1st Cir. 1997) ("A party waives a right when it makes 
an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of it").73 
Ms. Stewart also waived any objection to the Conversation by not objecting to the 
admission of the translation made by the expert engaged by Dr. Chen. See State v. Smedley, 
2003 UT App. 79, \ 10, 67 P.3d 1005, 1007-08 (and authorities cited therein); State v. 
Beason, 2000 UT App. 109, If 14. 2 P.3d 459, 461-62 (and authorities cited therein). 
Finally, Ms. Stewart is bound by the admissions against interest she made in her Third 
and Fourth Affirmations concerning the Conversation which were admitted into evidence 
without objection. Addendum G, H.74 
4. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED EXHIBIT 104 AS 
EVIDENCE OF MS. STEWART'S CONTEMPT. 
a. MS. STEWART CANNOT CLAIM, FOR THE FIRST TIME 
ON APPEAL, THE COURT IMPROPERLY CONSIDERED 
EXHIBIT 104 AGAINST HER. 
In her Motion to Strike, Ms. Stewart objected to the use of Exhibit 104 to impeach Mr. 
Hu on the wholly unsupported assertion that it had been obtained illegally. R. 14232: 72. 
Her Motion to Strike was considered and denied prior to the filing of the Contempt Motions. 
to preserve for appeal an objection to certain evidence, he must refrain from offering the 
evidence himself, wait to see if it is offered by the opposing party, and if so enter an 
objection."). 
73When Mr. Hu was testifying, Ms. Stewart's counsel, on re-direct, asked Mr. Hu 
foundational questions which he answered. See State v. Turtle, 399 P.2d 580, 582 (Utah 
1965) (where defendant made use of questioned evidence and conducted examination on 
basis of such evidence before stating objection to it, he waived objection). 
74See Utah Rules of Evidence, 801(d)(2). The rale recognizes the inherent reliability of a 
party's admissions against interest. 
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At no time during the trial court's consideration of the Contempt Motions did Ms. Stewart 
object to the use of Exhibit 104 as substantive evidence of her contempt. Nor did she object 
to the admission of Dr. Chen's translation at any time. R. 14254: 32-33. Ms. Stewart is 
barred from raising the issue now. 
Ms. Stewart also did not object to the admission of her Affirmations from the Hong 
Kong Case. The Affirmations also authenticated Exhibit 104 and were admissions that she 
attempted to mislead the court. With an admission in evidence, Dr. Chen filed the Contempt 
Motion referencing Exhibit 104, clearly making substantive use of its contents as evidence 
of Ms. Stewart's obstruction of justice. Now for the first time on appeal, Ms. Stewart makes 
the impeachment vis-a-vis substantive evidence argument. 
This Court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal, including 
constitutional issues. Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 258 (Utah 1998); see also Monson v. 
Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996). To properly preserve an issue for appeal, a party 
must raise it in a manner in which the "trial court [is] offered an opportunity to rule on [the] 
issue." Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). "A trial court has 
the opportunity to rule if the following three requirements are met: (1) 'the issue must be 
raised in a timely fashion;' (2) 'the issue must be specifically raised;' and (3) a party must 
introduce 'supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.'" Id. (citation omitted).75 Ms. 
Stewart satisfied none of these conditions. There is no basis for the Court to consider such 
75
 The only exceptions to the preservation requirement are plain error and manifest 
injustice, neither of which is applicable here. See State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 
(Utah 1994). 
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belated claim now. 
b. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED EXHIBIT 
104 AS EVIDENCE OF MS. STEWART'S CONTEMPT. 
(1) Ms. Stewart Authenticated Exhibit 104. 
Ms. Stewart authenticated the Conversation in her Third Affirmation in the Hong 
Kong Case before Dr. Chen filed the Contempt Motion relating to the Conversation. Her 
Fourth Affirmation makes the same authentication. Those Affirmations are admissions 
against interest. See Utah Rules of Evidence, 801(d)(2). 
(2) Ms. Stewart Affirmatively Used Exhibit 104. 
Ms. Stewart made affirmative use of the Conversation, engaging the services of an 
expert translator, which translation was admitted into evidence. Addendum J. She also did 
not object to the admission of the translation prepared by Dr. Chen's expert. 
(3) The Adverse Inference Was Properly Extended. 
The court also properly admitted Exhibit 104 as impeachment evidence against Mr. 
Hu after he invoked the Fifth Amendment on foundational questions, and then properly 
extended the adverse inference to Ms. Stewart. In LiButti v. United States, 107 F.3d 110 (2d 
Cir. 1997) (cited in SEC v. Wolfson, 2004 WL 985948, n.2 (D. Utah April 7, 2004)), Ms. 
LiButti brought a wrongful levy action. The IRS had assessed unpaid taxes against her father 
and believed he was the "effective owner" of Devil His Due, a race horse, and levied against 
the horse and its earnings. Id. at 113. Her father refused to answer deposition questions 
about whether he owned some interest in the horse. Id. 117-18. Concerning extending 
adverse inferences to a party when a non-party witness invokes the Fifth Amendment in civil 
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cases, id. at 120-25, the court suggested "a number of non-exclusive factors which should 
guide a trial court," including: (a) "The Nature of the Relevant Relationships"76; (b) "The 
Degree of Control of the Party Over the Non-Party Witness"77; (c) "The Compatibility of the 
Interests of the Party and Non-Party Witness in the Outcome of the Litigation"78; and (d) 
"The Role of the Non-Party Witness in the Litigation."79 Id. at 123-24.80 
Considering these factors,81 the adverse inference from Mr. Hu's invocation of the 
Fifth Amendment is attributable to Ms. Stewart: (a) Ms. Stewart recruited Mr. Hu from his 
76This factor "should be examined . . . from the perspective of a non-party witness5 
loyalty to the . . . defendant.... The closer the bond, whether by reason of blood, 
friendship or business, the less likely the non-party witness would be to render testimony 
in order to damage the relationship." 107 F.3d at 123. 
77
"The degree of control which the party has vested in the non-party witness in 
regard to the key facts and general subject matter of the litigation will likely inform the 
trial court whether the assertion of the privilege should be viewed as akin to testimony 
approaching admissibility under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2), and may accordingly be viewed 
. . . as a vicarious admission." 107 F.3d at 123. 
78
"The trial court should evaluate whether the non-party witness is pragmatically a 
noncaptioned party in interest and whether the assertion of the privilege advances the 
interests of both the non-party witness and the affected party in the outcome of the 
litigation." 107 F.3d at 123. 
79
"Whether the non-party witness was a key figure in the litigation and played a 
controlling role in respect to any of its underlying aspects also logically merits 
consideration by the court." 107 F.3d at 123-24. 
80The court concluded: "the circumstances of this case compel the admissibility 
and consideration by the trial court of Roberts' refusal to answer the questions addressed 
to him that struck directly at the only issue before the court-whether he or his daughter 
was the effective owner of. . . Devil His Due." 
*
]See also Parker v. Olympus Health Care, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1001-02 (D. 
Utah 2003) (discussing similar factors); Garrish v. United Auto., 284 F. Supp. 2d 782 
(E.D. Mich. 2003) (discussing same factors). 
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position as manager of a Territorial Owner, transferred hundreds of thousands of dollars to 
him to establish a Rogue Distributor, misappropriated Excel USA product and surreptitiously 
shipped it to him to sustain his Rogue Distributorship until products from her competing 
enterprise became available, and utilized his services to undercut Territorial Owners' sales 
and damage their good-will in critical markets. R. 14247:41-43; 118-121; R. 14245: 24-34, 
37-40, 58-9, 79; R. 14342: Ex. 274; (b) the factors discussed in (a) above establish a closely 
allied relationship in which Ms. Stewart exercised a high degree of control over Mr. Hu in 
exchange for his loyalty in destroying Territorial Owners and, ultimately, Excel USA; (c) the 
litigation was brought in order to end the mischief Ms. Stewart and those working in active 
concert and participation with her were causing Excel USA and the Territorial Owners. Mr. 
Hu clearly has the same interest in the outcome of the litigation as does Ms. Stewart; and (d) 
Mr. Hu was a key figure and played a controlling role with respect to the underlying aspects 
of the litigation. Ms. Stewart deemed him of such significance to her defense that she called 
him as her first witness. 
B. EXERCISE OF THE COURT'S CONTEMPT POWER WAS PROPER. 
The heralded purpose of the judicial system is to dispense justice, according all 
impartial and unbiased consideration. Ms. Stewart's calculated violation of court Orders and 
her deliberate and wilful concealment and destruction of evidence made it impossible for Dr. 
Chen and her children to ever be accorded a fair trial. Striking Ms. Stewart's pleadings for 
her willful violation of two Orders and her obstruction of justice was required. 
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1. MS. STEWART CANNOT CLAIM FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL, THE COURT LACKED AUTHORITY TO STRIKE HER 
PLEADINGS. 
Ms. Stewart asserts that she preserved the issue of the court's authority to strike her 
pleadings as a sanction for contempt at R. 7182-743 8 (Trial Brief), R. 14291: 127-214 (oral 
argument), R. 6060-6094 (Motion to Dismiss for failure to produce Dr. Chen and Mr. 
Zhang). Dr. Chen respectfully disagrees that Ms. Stewart preserved such issue at any of 
those references. This Court should decline to consider the claim now, since it is raised for 
the first time on appeal. 
2. THE COURT'S ACTION WAS NEITHER CAPRICIOUS NOR 
ARBITRARY. 
Ms. Stewart willfully violated the TRO. She willfully violated the Interim Order. She 
conspired to obstruct justice and carried out her plan. She displayed contempt for the court's 
authority and for the oath she swore to tell the truth. Her plan to prevent Dr. Chen, her 
children and other litigants from having the opportunity to present their grievances and 
receive a fair hearing nearly succeeded. Her actions made it impossible for such to now ever 
occur. She defrauded the court through the spoliation of evidence which, to this day, has not 
been returned. The "missing" evidence would undoubtedly further confirm the wrongful 
nature of the identified acts. The trial court could protect innocent litigants and the integrity 
of cases entrusted to the court in no other way. 
The trial court has broad discretion in the exercise of its contempt power, both civil 
and criminal, which will not be disturbed except for action "which is so unreasonable as to 
be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of. . . discretion." Shipman v. 
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Evans, 2004 UT 44, fflj 39-41 (citations omitted). This Court stated in Von Hake v. Thomas, 
759 P.2d 1162, 1166-67 (Utah 1988): 
Utah law on the subject of contempt must be drawn together from case law and from 
statutes. The earliest law in this area is decisional and based on the common law. 
The substantive and procedural rules were then altered by statute. This legislation 
was not comprehensive, and our subsequent decision seem to take the position that 
to the extent the common law was not inconsistent with the statutes, its survives and 
can continue to evolve. 
A trial court's power to act in the administration of justice is well established. Courts 
have "inherent powers not derived from any statute" to control the proceedings before them. 
SeeGriffithv. Griffith, 1999UT78,U 13, 985 P.2d255 (citingInreEvans, 130P. 217,224-
25 (Utah 1913)). This Court has long held: 
[Cjourts of general and superior jurisdiction possess certain inherent powers not 
derived from any statute. Among these are the power to punish for contempt, to 
make, modify, and enforce rules for the regulation of the business before the court, 
to amend its record and proceedings, to recall and control its process, . . . . Such 
inherent powers of courts are necessary to the proper discharge of their duties [A] 
constitutional court of general and superior jurisdiction may exercise such inherent 
powers and summary jurisdiction as the necessity of the case may require, and in 
manner comporting with a proper discharge of its duties in the premises. 
In re Evans, 130 P. 217, 224-25 (Utah 1913).82 A court may use these inherent powers to 
sanction litigants. In appropriate cases, a court can impose the sanction of dismissal by 
default.83 
82Ms. Stewart suggests that the legislature has limited the court's ability to fashion 
appropriate remedies in its administration of justice. Stewarts' Brief, at 52-53. Where 
the contumacious conduct goes to the heart of the integrity of the judicial process, the 
court, as a coordinate branch of government, does have the inherent authority to control 
the proceedings before it. See In the interest of J.E.S., 817 P.2d 508, 511-13 (Colo. 1991) 
(legislature may not unduly limit sanctions for contumacious conduct). 
"See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991); Pope v. Federal Express 
Corp, 91A F.2d 982, 984 (8th Cir. 1992). Cf Archibeque v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa 
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Ms. Stewart's characterization of the court's authority to strike pleadings as a sanction 
for contempt was incomplete. She improperly labeled the trial court's action umere 
punishment" for contumacious conduct. This is not true. While courts have held that a court 
may not strike an answer and issue default for contumacious conduct unrelated to the merits 
of the case, Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409, 413-14 (1897), the opposite is true when the 
misconduct of a party interferes with the fairness of the proceeding. Hammond Packing Co. 
v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 350-51 (1909).84 
The "striking of pleadings, entering of default, and rendering of judgment against a 
disobedient party are the most severe of the potential sanctions that can be imposed upon a 
. . . party." Utah Department ofTransp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 8 (Utah 1995). Where 
a party willfully, however, or in bad faith fails to comply with a court order that undermines 
Fe Ry. Co., 70 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 1995). 
84The Hammond Court explained: 
The proceeding here taken may therefore find its sanction in the undoubted right 
of the lawmaking power to create a presumption of fact as to the bad faith and 
untruth of an answer to be gotten from the suppression or failure to produce the 
proof ordered, when such proof concerned the rightful decision of the cause. In a 
sense, of course, the striking out of the answer and default was a punishment, but 
it was only remotely so, as the generating source of the power was the right to 
create a presumption flowing from the failure to produce. The difference between 
mere punishment, as illustrated in Hovey v. Elliott, and the power exerted in this, 
is as follows: In this, the preservation of due process was secured by the 
presumption that the refusal to produce evidence material to the administration of 
due process was but an admission of the want of merit in the asserted defense. 
212 U.S. at 350-51 (emphasis supplied). 
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the integrity of the cause, this sanction is appropriate.85 Id. (prejudice to government resulted 
from party's discovery abuses, justifying the striking of landowner's answer). Such sanction 
in cases involving destruction or spoliation of evidence is particularly appropriate. Litigants 
have an "affirmative duty to preserve evidence which might be relevant to the issues in the 
lawsuit." In re Wechsler, 121 F. Supp. 2d 404, 415 (D. Del. 2000).86 
The sanction of striking pleadings also serves "an important deterrent value." Id. at 
429. "Imposing a dispositive sanction for this type of conduct punishes the wrongdoer for 
the severity of its culpable conduct, and serves to put the public on notice that this type of 
behavior will be punished severely." Id. Another court explained: 
Permitting this lawsuit to proceed would be an open invitation to abuse the 
judicial process. Litigants would infer they have everything to gain, and 
nothing to lose, if manufactured evidence merely is excluded while their 
lawsuit continues. Litigants must know that the courts are not open to a person 
who would seek justice by fraudulent means. 
Brady v. United States, 877 F. Supp. 444,453 (CD. 111. 1994). The court's authority and the 
appropriateness of the action taken are both beyond question.87 
85Courts have employed their inherent powers to impose the sanction of default in 
cases involving behavior of the type in which Ms. Stewart engaged. Brady v. United 
States, 877 F. Supp. 444, 452 (CD. 111. 1994) (destruction of evidence); Combs v. 
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 927 F.2d 486, 488 (9th Cir. 1991) (falsification of testimony), 
Vargas v. Peltz, 901 F. Supp. 1572, 1581 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (perjury and obstruction of 
justice). 
uSee L. Solum and S. Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the 
Destruction of Evidence, 36 Emory L.J. 1085, 1095-96 (Fall 1987) (summarizing cases 
applying inherent power). 
87The trial court found Ms. Stewart in both civil and criminal contempt. Striking 
Ms. Stewart's pleadings was appropriate under either or both contempt findings. In the 
criminal context the remedy vindicated the court's authority through punishment for 
violation of Orders, and it was necessary to preserve the integrity of the proceedings and 
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3. MS. STEWART FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
Ms. Stewart failed to marshal the evidence88 in support of her assertion that the trial 
court abused its discretion in striking her pleadings as a sanction for her contempt.89 The 
properly marshaled evidence, as set forth in the Statement of Facts herein. Ms. Stewart's 
characterization of facts at pages 54-55 of her Brief are set in the light most favorable to 
herself and does not fulfill her marshaling obligation. Some material omissions follow: (a) 
protect the administration of justice because the contumacious conduct (obstruction and 
spoliation) had made the proceedings inherently and irreparably unfair. For civil 
contempt striking the pleadings could be considered remedial because Ms. Stewart's 
contumacious activities made it certain that Dr. Chen could not receive the process she 
was due. Given Ms. Stewart's conduct, there was no way the trial court could otherwise 
administer justice. Ms. Stewart's obstruction and spoliation could be purged only by the 
court granting Dr. Chen the relief she sought in her Verified Complaint because Ms. 
Stewart had successfully hijacked the only vehicle through which Dr. Chen could obtain 
relief, the judicial process. 
88Examples of improper marshaling include (a) the assertions that "there was little 
in the way of actual damage to E. Excel for any purported violation of the Interim Order 
or the [TRO]. Most of the criticized conduct was easily cured," Stewarts' Brief, at 54, 
and (b) the list of twelve categories of contumacious acts for which Ms. Stewart 
minimizes and mischaracterizes the injury to Excel USA: (1) Territorial Owners did not 
produce written contracts, so it was their own fault Ms. Stewart did not ship them 
product; (2) no cactus juice was damaged; (3) the rodents were removed within two days 
and Excel USA had had prior rodent problems; (4) product that was removed was 
returned; (5) Ms. Stewart was rarely at Excel USA when the violations occurred; (6) the 
surveillance system incurred no permanent damage; (7) missing reports were recreated at 
nominal cost; (8) analytical and toxicology reports were easily replaced; (9) Excel USA 
attorneys were given opportunity to review records in the possession of Ms. Stewart's 
counsel; (10) Ms. Stewart "made every reasonable effort to return any equipment, 
inventory, and corporate records removed from" Excel USA; and, (11) Taig Stewart 
returned more equipment and software than Excel USA claimed was missing; (12) $1,925 
million taken from Excel USA's operating account was repayment of a loan. Id. at 54-55. 
*
9See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-38 (Utah 1994). The Court therefore is 
entitled to assume that the Contempt Findings are adequately supported by the evidence. 
Utah Medical Products, Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 233 (Utah 1998). 
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Ms. Stewart obstructed justice, suborned perjury, and committed perjury; (b) Ms. Stewart 
refused to ship products to the Territorial Owners pursuant to their confirmed orders in the 
face of the TRO requiring her to do so, resulting in substantial damage to Territorial Owners 
and exposure to Excel USA, and she removed Excel USA's contracts with Territorial Owners 
and then asserted, in court, there were no contracts requiring such shipments; (c) Ms. Stewart 
used nominees and agents to do her bidding in order to prevent discovery of her involvement 
in violating the Orders, so her presence or absence at Excel USA's offices was of little 
consequence; (d) Ms. Warner's dismantling of the surveillance system allowed a number of 
nefarious events to take place without being preserved on video tape; (e)Ms. Stewart's return 
of some Excel USA property-some damaged and unusable—nearly eight months after she 
was ordered immediately to return the product deprived Excel USA of essential property to 
operate its business; (f) Ms. Stewart shipped product to Rogue Distributors in violation of 
the Orders, for which Excel USA never received payment and which the Rogue Distributors 
used to set up competing distribution systems to undermine the Territorial Owners' markets 
and good will; (g) Ms. Stewart established a competing enterprise on the broken back of 
Excel USA and recruited employees and former employees of Excel USA to assist her in 
establishing her enterprise in violation of the non-competition agreements which she caused 
to be removed from Excel USA's files and premises; (h) she approved of the placement of 
rodents in the Excel USA during the First Preliminary Injunction Hearing which threatened 
Excel USA's standing with the FDA, and the existence of the rodents was falsely reported 
to the court as the reason behind removal of the product; (i) Ms. Stewart to this day has failed 
to return significant quantities of documents; (j) there is no evidence in the record of a $ 1.925 
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million loan Ms. Stewart made to Excel USA or of Board approval for repayment of the so-
called loan; (k) Ms. Stewart's obstruction of justice, her spoliation of substantial quantities 
of documentary and electronic evidence, her removal of Excel USA's contracts with 
Territorial Owners, her removal of non-competition agreements, and her use of multiple 
nominees to prevent discovery of her flagrant and ongoing violations of the Orders, all 
demonstrate Ms. Stewart undermined the court's ability to administrate justice and Dr. 
Chen's right to a fair adjudication of her claims. 
C MS. STEWART WAS ACCORDED DUE PROCESS, 
1. MS. STEWART FAILED TO DEMAND A JURY. 
Rule 17, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides in part: 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant 
waives a jury in open cour t . . . . 
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the 
defendant makes written demand at least ten days prior to trial. 
Ms. Stewart did not demand a jury in writing or otherwise. The issue was not preserved. 
2. MS. STEWART CANNOT RAISE, FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL. THE SCOPE OF THE EVIDENCE. 
Ms. Stewart complains, for the first time on appeal, that the scope of the evidence the 
court considered was broader than alleged in the Contempt Motions, suggesting she was not 
on proper notice. The Court should decline to consider the claim now. 
The Affidavits setting forth Ms. Stewart's conduct and the Contempt Motions are 
extensive and address her contumacious conduct in violation of the Orders, providing Ms. 
Stewart proper notice of the allegations of wrongdoing. See Addendum E; R. 2074, 2078, 
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2096,2135. Moreover, certain of Ms. Stewart's contumacious conduct occurred during the 
pendency of the OSC Hearings, and as those matters were addressed, Ms. Stewart did not 
assert that she lacked notice of allegations of her ongoing violations, nor was she deprived 
the opportunity to respond. 
3. MR. HOLMAN'S INVOLVEMENT DID NOT PREJUDICE MS-
STEWART. 
a. THE STEWARTS' ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE 
SPECIAL MASTER ARE IMPROPER. 
In its November 2002 Order, this Court dismissed, sua sponte, Ms. Stewart's and Taig 
Stewart's "issues dealing with the appointment of the Special Master." Addendum B. 
Despite this Order, the Stewarts spend a number of pages asserting the special master had an 
improper role in the OSC Hearings. Stewart's Brief, at 61-66. These arguments violate the 
letter and spirit of the Court's November 2002 Order.90 
b. NO DUE PROCESS CLAIM WAS PRESERVED. 
Until filing her Notice of Appeal, R. 8777, the Stewarts raised no concerns that Mr. 
Holman's involvement in the Preliminary Injunction Hearing on Excel USA's and Ms. 
Stewart's cross Motions, which were considered simultaneously with the OSC Hearings, 
tainted the OSC Hearings. The Court should decline to consider the claim now. 
c. EVIDENCE DEVELOPED INDEPENDENT OF MR. 
HOLMAN'S INVOLVEMENT SUPPORTS THE ORDERS. 
In its January 24, 2003 Order denying the Motion to Vacate, the trial court clarified: 
90The basis of the special master's appointment and the actions he took after his 
appointment go hand in hand and are briefed in the Special Master Appeal. Addendum L. 
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"This Court concludes that the outcome of the hearings would not have been any different 
if the errors alleged by Madam Chen, particularly regarding the Special Master, had never 
occurred." R. 12760. The undisputed record evidence of Ms. Stewart's contumacious 
conduct, independent of Mr. Holman's involvement, bears this out. 
Under both translations, which the trial court found were not materially different, Ms. 
Stewart obstructed justice. Her perjurious testimony of February 8, 2001, carried out her 
plan, as did Mr. Hu's testimony of February 13, 2001. Ms. Stewart's Third and Fourth 
Affirmations, by her own admission, acknowledged her attempt to mislead the Utah court. 
And, Addendum J, the translation her expert prepared, reveals the conspiracy. Her testimony 
given during the OSC Hearings (prior to the court's combining those Hearings with hearings 
on the cross Motions for Preliminary Injunction), while a further attempt to mislead the court, 
also confirmed her obstruction of justice and perjury. See Addendum N. 
Ms. Stewart's violation of the TRO and Interim Order by failing to fill confirmed 
orders, shipping products to Rogue Distributors, her acts of sabotage, conversion of Excel 
USA property and establishment of a competing enterprise are not subject to realistic dispute. 
The evidence in support thereof is overwhelming without the involvement of Mr. Holman. 
X. CONCLUSION 
The Contempt Orders should be affirmed. The integrity of the judiciary cannot be 
open to siege through recalcitrance. The actions taken by the trial court were necessary and 
proper. 
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